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CONTENTS

INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS

- Saudis Plan To Become Involved in Sea Transport
(AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO, 8 Jun 81)..... 1

PERSIAN GULF AFFAIRS

- Israeli Intentions in Gulf Cited
(Abd-al-Karim Abu-al-Nasr; Al-MAJALLAH, 23 May 81)..... 3

AFGHANISTAN

- Party Paper Comments on Government's Peace Proposal
(HAQIQAT-E ENQELAB-E SAWR, 17 May 81)..... 9

- U.S. Imperialism Seen as Major Block to Solution of Afghan Problem
(ANIS, 21 May 81)..... 11

- Reporter From Pro-PRC Organ Visits Guerrillas
(GNISTAN, 10 Apr 81)..... 14

Afghanistan's Holy War, by Christer Lundgren
'Border Defense,' Russian Style, by Kristian Gerner
Allah Factor in Policy, by Jan Samuelsson
Sweden Rejects Afghan Refugees, by Thomas Kanger

- Insurgents Step Up Resistance Against Soviets, Karmal
(Various sources, various dates)..... 35

Overflow at Kabul Hospitals
Raid on Airport
Women Attack Soviet-Karmal Force
Destruction of Soviet-Karmal Force
Dwindling of Karmal Troops, by Prakash Chandra
Fresh Attacks on Kabul Forces
Defection of Karmal Officers

Hostile Actions Plague Karmal's Forces (Various sources, various dates).....	44
Bus Hijack	
Mob Attacks	
Troop Ambushes	
Massive Desertions	
Amnesty Offer	
IRAN	
Mo'infar's Strong Defense for Bani-Sadr at Majles (ETTELA'AT, 22 Jun 81).....	48
Cabinet Official Analyzes This Year's Budget (Mohammed Taqi Banki; KEYHAN, 27 May 81).....	56
SAUDI ARABIA	
Briefs	
Saudi Pipeline to Yanbu To Begin Operation	61
SYRIA	
Government Faces Problems Controlling Prices, Curbing Profiteers (Naji As'ad; TISHRIN, 22 May 81).....	62
Problem of Desert Encroachment Reviewed (Afif al-Razzaz; AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI, 25-31 May 81).....	66
UNITED ARAB EMIRATES	
Zayid's Performance, Leadership Analyzed (AL-MAJALLAH, 23 May 81).....	69

SAUDIS PLAN TO BECOME INVOLVED IN SEA TRANSPORT

Paris AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English 8 Jun 81 Vol No 23 pp 3-4

[Text]

The Saudi National Shipping Company (SNSC) is expected to announce in the near future a major contract for four 35,000-tonne deadweight roll-on, roll-off container vessels. The four ships would be the biggest of their kind in the world, and orders for them would underline Saudi Arabia's intentions to secure for itself a major share of the lucrative freight traffic between the Kingdom and the outside world.

News that a decision on which of 10 major international shipyards would be awarded the contract was given on May 29 by Donald Todd, an adviser to the SNSC. He was quoted by the London shipping daily *Lloyd's List* as saying the SNSC was expected to take its decision very shortly.

Delivery of the four vessels would be in about two years, with each of the ships having an enormous cargo capacity of 2,000 TEUs (twenty foot equivalent units). This compares with the large - but soon to be no more than modest - size of SNSC's first two container vessels, each of which is only 1,250 TEUs.

The two ships are the *Saudi Makkah* and the *Saudi Riyadh*, bought from the Kuwait Investment Company and formerly known as the *Seaspeed Asia* and the *Seaspeed Arabia* respectively.

The Saudis intend to use these two ships, and a third to be chartered in the near future, to capture a major share of the US-Saudi shipping trade.

The starting date for the Saudi effort to become a significant maritime force in the container trade is June 22, when the *Saudi Makkah* is due to start its first sailing from Houston to Jeddah, Dubai and Dammam.

Although some 293 vessels, with a total tonnage (gross) of 1,985,266 tonnes, operate under the Saudi flag, the SNSC is Saudi Arabia's first wholly-owned shipping company. Thirty per cent of the equity comes from major Saudi industrial concerns, 25 per cent from

the government and the remaining 45 per cent from 13,600 private Saudi shareholders.

The first three vessels should make around 18 to 23 sailings a year between the Gulf of Mexico, the US East Coast and Arabia and the Gulf. In particular, the SNSC is looking to capture all the important construction industry cargo trade between the US and Saudi Arabia.

Speaking at a handover ceremony marking the acquisition of the first two container vessels in April, the SNSC's Managing Director, Dr Abdulaziz Al-Turki, said Saudi Arabia's decision to embark on a wholly-owned shipping enterprise had been taken for a blend of commercial and strategic reasons.

Foreign companies were charging exorbitant fees, inflated by war risk surcharges, while the security of shipping supply had also been an important factor in persuading the Saudis to run their own ships. With rapid industrialisation, it was vital for the Saudis to become commercially involved in sea transport, he said.

The new fleet will be staffed by British officers and Sierra Leone ratings, supplied by Tryport Ferries, a subsidiary of the Glasgow company, Denholm MacLay. The staffing agreement is considered a great achievement for this Scottish management company in the highly competitive ship management field.

Lloyd's List reported that the SNSC "definitely" plans to establish its operational headquarters in Britain. Eventually the SNSC plans to use its ships on runs to Europe and the Far East.

The establishment of the SNSC reflects an increasing trend in the Gulf and Mashreq towards greater state regulation and active participation in shipping affairs by the more conservative and laissez-faire governments of the region. In the case of Saudi Arabia, it should be noted that the government has taken considerable interest in the formation of the newly constituted Saudi Livestock and Trading Company, which was

set up with \$30 million capital and with the intention of capturing 50 per cent of the highly profitable Australia-Saudi sheep trade.

Elsewhere in the region, the shipping situation is as follows:

Kuwait:

In Kuwait, the oil tanker fleet, the largest in the world, is expanding rapidly. Delivery is at present due on four 80,000 dwt tankers. The national fleet already totals 235 vessels, totalling 2,192,005 gross tonnes.

During the 1980 rationalisation of the domestic oil companies, the Kuwait Oil Tanker Company was merged with other state companies to form part of the new Kuwait Petroleum Corporation. By 1984, according to the authoritative survey, *Arab Shipping 1981*, Kuwaiti tankers should be carrying 40 per cent of Kuwaiti crude oil exports, 60 per cent of its refined oil exports and 50 per cent of LPG exports. Six products tankers are under construction in Taiwan and four more will probably be ordered.

Bahrain:

The Bahrain national fleet consists of 37 vessels with a total gross tonnage of 9,344 tonnes. The government has avoided the usual need to establish a state shipping line by holding a sizeable minority stake in both the United Arab Shipping Company (UASC) and in the Arab Maritime Petroleum Transport Company, which operates under the aegis of OAPEC.

A further block to any ideas for state sponsored shipping expansion has been the lack of the necessary maritime law, although such legislation is currently under discussion. Eventually, vessels theoretically owned by Bahrain within UASC will be transferred to Bahraini registration while remaining under UASC ownership.

Curiously, despite Bahrain's reputation as a banking centre, no shipping entrepreneur has emerged to tap this source of capital to set up a local privately-owned fleet, even under a flag of convenience.

The UASC is pressing on with its expansion and modernisation programme in spite of disappointing financial results. *Arab Shipping* noted reports that a further six 18-knot container vessels of between 1,500 and 1,800 TEUs were to be ordered, possibly from Japanese builders. The UASC has already placed tentative orders for six containerships with Japanese yards and is reported intending to increase the number of its container, bulk and car carriers. In particular, the company intends to extend its breakbulk services to the US.

All but Saudis and Iraqis fly the Kuwaiti flag

During 1981, as various member countries frame their own maritime legislation, they will start receiving their share of the UASC's tonnage. Iraq has already received all the 11 ships it is due to receive, while Saudi Arabia has received two of its 12. The UAE is eventually to get 12 vessels, Qatar 12, Kuwait 11 and Bahrain just two.

The total fleet of 60 vessels has a total gross tonnage of 860,867 tonnes. Until legislation is passed by the final flag carriers, all but the Saudi Arabian and Iraqi ships carry the Kuwaiti flag.

Qatar:

At present, Qatar's national fleet comprises 37 ships totalling 101,297 gross tonnes. This will increase as the UASC ships are handed over. Meanwhile, the state-run Qatar National Navigation and Transport Company has opened up several profitable new sea routes with its six freighters.

UAE:

The Abu Dhabi National Tanker Company has ordered six products tankers. Three vessels of 56,000 tonnes deadweight each are to be built in France by Chantiers de l'Atlantique, while one 56,000 dwt and two 35,000 dwt are to be built by the Korea Shipbuilding and Engineering Corporation. All are due for delivery in 1983. Further along the coast, at Dubai, the dhow remains a staple of maritime transport, accounting for about \$200 million worth of Dubai's trade each year. There are signs, too, that Dubai's dhow trade with Iran, which suffered with the onset of the Iran-Iraq war, is picking up rapidly.

Jordan:

Jordan is in the curious position of having already established a set of maritime laws while scarcely possessing a national fleet. All that Jordan has is a single cargo vessel, of just 496 gross tonnes. But in cooperation with Syria it operates two 6,300 dwt freighters between Syria's Mediterranean ports and Europe, while the Jordan National Line (JNL) is making arrangements to charter vessels for its own use. These would probably be 10,000 dwt vessels.

ISRAELI INTENTIONS IN GULF CITED

London AL-MAJALLAH in Arabic 23 May 81 pp 12-13, 16

[Article by 'Abd-al-Karim Abu-al-Nasr: "Israel's Battle Against Gulf; AL-MAJALLAH Publishes Serious Information on Eve of Gulf Summit in Abu Dhabi; Western Experts Assert Israel Has 'Contingency Plan' Against Oil Wells"]

[Text] For some time now, we have been trying to gather the largest possible amount of information and facts concerning an extremely significant and serious topic with which nobody, whether from the Arab world or from the West, has yet dealt at length and in detail. This topic is: Israel's battle against the Arab Gulf states. Naturally, it is easy to gather a large volume of information on Israel's battle against the Palestinians or against any of the Arab frontline states, for example. This battle is clearcut and its effects and impact are felt in more than one position and front, especially in Lebanon.

But we have discovered that it is not easy to gather information and facts on Israel's battle against the Gulf, even though this battle is important and serious and is not just a "theoretical" battle or a battle of "propaganda campaigns." This battle has come to assume a priority in the calculations and plans of the Jewish state, especially in the wake of the Camp David accords and of Egypt's withdrawal from the Arab arena. One aspect of the serious nature of this battle, with which the Arab reader is, naturally, eager to be familiarized, is that it is a secret and relatively new battle that is being waged by Israel in several arenas.

This report, published by AL-MAJALLAH on the eve of the convocation of the Gulf summit in the presence of the leaders of the member states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (the summit will be held on 25 May in Abu Dhabi) reveals many aspects of this Israeli battle. In gathering the information for this report, I have relied on four basic sources:

The opinions of a number of western experts on Mideastern strategic and military affairs. We have interviewed five such experts in London and Paris.

An official U.S. report issued in March 1981 by the U.S. House of Representatives Foreign Affairs Committee under the title of "U.S. Security Interests in the Gulf."

A book published recently in the United States by Dr Joseph (Chorba) under the title of "Retreat From Freedom." The significance and importance of this book

lies in the fact that (Chorba) was a prominent official of the U.S. military intelligence on Mideastern affairs, that he is considered an adviser to Israel, that he now works in the Reagan administration and that he represents one of the pillars of the intransigent, Zionist current flowing through it. Chorba is a friend of Richard Allen, Reagan's national security affairs adviser, who has written the prologue to this book. The book reflects clearly and strongly the pro-Israel view in the U.S. administration.

A number of reports published by the U.S. strategic institutes and by the French Institute for International Relations.

Contingency Military Plans

The point on which well-informed western experts concerned with the Middle East affairs agree is that Israel has numerous "contingency plans" for military operations of various dimensions and ranges against the Arab Gulf area. The formulation of these plans began in earnest in the wake of the 1973 war, the emergence of oil as an effective power in the international arena and the escalating influence of the Gulf oil countries in the western world. These "contingency plans" are shrouded, of course, in complete secrecy and the Israeli authorities allow no information to be leaked about them. But the conclusions and analyses of the western experts reveal the following:

The early contingency plans formulated immediately after the 1973 war focused on having the Israelis perform an "assisting" role for the western, especially the U.S., forces in case the latter embark on a military operation to gain control of the oil wells as a result of the eruption of an "oil crisis" or of a major crisis in that area. It is no coincidence that 1974 witnessed the emergence of a large number of researchers, studies and books, especially in the United States and by pro-Israel figures, speaking of the possibility of control of the Gulf oil wells by the U.S. forces and drawing up various scenarios in this regard. At that time, the Israeli Government notified Washington that the Israeli army was ready to intervene against the Gulf states in case an "oil crisis" developed.

Later on the Israelis drew up a different kind of contingency plans to face what they called "the threats coming from the Gulf." The most obvious causes of these threats, according to the Israelis, are Saudi Arabia's acquisition of the sophisticated U.S. F-15 aircraft, its bolstering its armed forces with modern, sophisticated weapons acquired from several western countries, implementation of the Iraqi nuclear program and the increased arming of the Gulf states generally. A few years ago, Israel began to consider the Gulf states generally, and Saudi Arabia in particular, "Arab frontline states." In his book, Chorba says: "Israel must take into its calculation the possibility that Saudi Arabia will launch attacks against it. Moreover, the Saudi threat against Israel may come in the form of a blockade in the Red Sea to prevent the passage of Israeli ships, in the form of forces sent to Syria and Jordan in case war erupts or in the form of sophisticated equipment and weapons sent to any state fighting Israel." The western experts say that they hear the following line of thought from the Israeli officials whenever they meet them: "Collectively, the Arab forces are now bigger than NATO's non-nuclear force in Europe. The Arab eastern front alone, which includes Syria, Jordan, Iraq and Saudi Arabia, has a military force equal to the NATO force in

Europe in terms of troops and tanks, and even exceeds the NATO force in tanks. A study prepared by the Israelis shows that the eastern front has 790,000 troops, 6,150 tanks and 1,210 aircraft and fighters. The eastern front, including Saudi Arabia, represents a major military threat to Israel, even with the absence of Egypt." The Israelis add: "The Saudis are currently building an important military base in Tabuk at a distance of minutes, by military aircraft, from the Israeli port of Elat. It is most likely that the sophisticated F-15 aircraft and other aircraft will be deployed in this base. Saudi Arabia's acquisition of the F-15 aircraft increases the possibilities of war. In case a crisis develops, Israel may launch an attack to strike the Saudi F-15 aircraft."

Moreover, the Israelis have "contingency plans" for commando operations or "secret raids" against some important installations or sites in the Gulf. The western experts say that the Israelis often act upon their private calculations and not according to U.S.-Israeli calculations. The Israelis did not hesitate, for example, to strike the Liberty, the U.S. spy ship, in the Mediterranean during the 1967 war because it had discovered their preparations for a confrontation with Syria.

Official U.S. Report

Israel's battle against the Gulf is not just of a military and strategic dimension. It is also a political battle. With the arrival of the Reagan administration, Israel has focused on the tune of the "important role" that it can perform to "protect the western interests" in the Gulf and to stop any Soviet infiltration in the area. There is a prominent trend within the Reagan administration strongly supporting this Israeli viewpoint. This trend is led by Richard Allen, Reagan's national security affairs adviser.

Perhaps what exposes this side of the Israeli schemes is an official report published by the U.S. Congress in March 1981 on the outcome of a tour made by an official U.S. mission to a number of Middle East countries, including the Gulf States, Israel, Egypt and the countries of the Horn of Africa. This important report reveals the following Israeli position toward the Gulf:

The Israelis believe that the USSR will embark on further "adventurous actions" in the Gulf area to strengthen its positions vis-a-vis the West and to try to make up for the oil shortage. The Israelis believe that the military facilities acquired by the United States in a number of Mideastern countries and the [U.S.] naval force in the area surrounding the Gulf are not enough to stand in the face of any serious military advance in the area. Therefore, there is no alternative to a permanent U.S. military presence in that area.

How Can Israel Help United States?

The Israelis say that they are prepared to cooperate with the United States and to assist it in its plans "to protect the western interests" in the Gulf area. Israel can offer the United States a great deal in this regard, especially in the following aspects:

1. The sophisticated Israeli radar networks can help the U.S. forces in any activity they embark upon.

2. Israel can help the Americans secure an air confrontation for the U.S. ships and aircraft carriers in the area.

3. The Israeli bases are adequate for launching points for any operations by the U.S. forces in the area.

4. Israel can provide storage for various U.S. tanks, vehicles and military equipment and can provide such material with maintenance and protection so that it may be used in any military operation.

5. Israel is currently building (under the supervision and with the aid of the United States) two important air bases in the Negev desert to replace its two bases in the Sinai from which it will withdraw in 1982 in accordance with the Camp David agreement. Israel is prepared to put these two bases at the disposal of the United States.

Another issue on which the Israelis have focused is that the Iraqi nuclear program poses a "serious threat" to the security of the Jewish State. The Israelis say in this regard: "We cannot, because of the area of the country and the population density, withstand a single nuclear blow."

What do these statements, contained in the official U.S. report, mean? The serious nature of these statements has in the fact that they come within the framework of Israel's battle against the Gulf. On the one hand, Israel encourages a viewpoint opposed to that of the Gulf states and based on the demand for a "permanent U.S. military presence in that area"--a viewpoint seeking to undermine Arab-U.S. relations. On the other hand, Israel projects itself as the only state in the Arab area capable of "protecting the western interests." This line of thinking leads to the demand for strengthening Israel to the maximum and, on the other hand, for withholding sophisticated weapons from the Gulf states.

The fact is that Israel has recently focused its battle against the Gulf in an endeavor to exert as much pressure as possible on the United States and the West European countries to prevent them from supplying Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states with sophisticated modern weapons and to obstruct the establishment of good and strong relations between these states and the West. The Israeli pressure exerted on the Reagan administration to prevent it from supplying Saudi Arabia with AWACS --the most sophisticated surveillance, observation and early-warning aircraft--is a fundamental part of the battle against the Gulf states. Israel is disturbed by Saudi acquisition of the AWACS, not just because these aircraft are capable of detecting any Israeli attempts for aggression against the Gulf and the neighboring countries but also because these deals reflect a large American interest in Saudi Arabia and an American eagerness to establish good relations with Saudi Arabia. It is to be noted that Israel has not gotten any AWACS even though it has asked for them. Menachem Begin's violent, and personal, attack against German Chancellor Schmidt, against former French President Giscard d'Estaing and against Austrian Chancellor Kreisky also falls within the framework of this battle. The main goal is to prevent these states from meeting the military needs and requests of the Gulf states so that the myth of the "Israeli bastion" defending the western interests may persist.

Israel Destroys Russian Fleet

Within this framework comes also the importance of the book by Joseph Chorbah who is considered one of the most prominent supporters of Israel in Reagan's administration. The serious views, information and proposals contained in this book expose basic aspects of Israel's battle against the Gulf. We have selected the following basic opinions and proposals from this book:

1. Israel's strategic location is important. It is an ideal location for launching U.S. forces in the direction of the Gulf. Moreover, Israel possesses the strongest and most modern air force in the Middle East and has the capability to provide storage for U.S. military weapons and equipment.

All this should make Israel the focus of U.S. steps and measures in the Middle East.

2. Lebanon, along with Israel, forms a barrier in the face of Soviet plans.

3. The United States in particular must avoid embracing the Arab view that the Palestinian problem is the fundamental element in the Middle East crisis. The Palestinian problem is not so and the long-range U.S. interests require that Israel be kept strong and allied with the United States.

4. The important point insofar as the U.S. national security is concerned is that Israel in itself is not an "ultimate goal" but a means to strengthen security and stability in the Middle East. Israel's presence is essential for bolstering U.S. and European interests and Israel has carried out and continues to carry out a number of strategic and military missions in the Middle East in the interest of the United States. An official U.S. study has shown that in case a non-nuclear armed conflagration erupts between the super powers in the Middle East, Israel by itself is capable of repelling the Soviet forces. This is something no other ally of the United States in the area is capable of doing.

5. On 21 January 1979, 174 U.S. generals and admirals sent a message to President Carter stating that if it were not for the presence of Israel with its military forces, the United States would have to send a large number of men [troops] and large quantities of weapons [to the Middle East]. Moreover, the U.S. Department of Defense has information to the effect that the Israeli air force is capable of destroying the Soviet fleet in the Mediterranean and of ousting it from the battle in minutes. The information supplied by Israeli intelligence to U.S. agencies on Soviet weapons and military equipment captured during Israel's wars with the Arabs was so important that it has made the U.S. Department of Defense reconsider its information on the Soviet forces' methods and means of movement in war. Moreover, Israel watches closely Soviet naval moves in the Mediterranean and the Red Sea and shares this information with the United States. All this should motivate the United States to enhance, not reduce, Israel's military and political power.

6. The Soviet Union is capable of embarking on a large-scale military act in the Gulf area. There is also the possibility of the eruption of a major conflagration

between the United States and Russia for either direct or indirect control of the sources of oil. In both cases, Israel poses an obstacle in the face of Soviet ambitions. The danger, all the danger, lies in the continued weakening of Israel and in exposing its security to danger to the point where it can no longer continue to be a strategic ally of the United States in the Middle East. What Israel fears is inability on the part of the United States to evaluate the political and strategic facts correctly, thus embracing positions and policies in the Middle East conflicting with Israel's positions and interests.

This image of Israel which Chorba reflects and his focusing on the importance of Israel's role in the area is a part of the battle waged by the Jewish State at more than one level against the Gulf. Chorba currently occupies the position of chairman of the International Security Center in Washington, in addition to his work as adviser for the Reagan administration and for Israel. He is deeply acquainted with many secrets of the Israeli position and of the U.S. position. His role in the United States is important in supporting and explaining the Israeli viewpoint.

What Chorba says in his book exposes an important aspect of Israel's battle against the Gulf: Israel wants to convince the United States and the West that it is their only ally in the Middle East and that it is the only one capable of confronting the "Soviet danger." Consequently, it must be strengthened militarily and politically and must not be weakened by supplying the Arab Gulf states with sophisticated weapons and military equipment. This is the aspect that Israel is stirring at present to exert pressure on the Reagan administration to block the AWACS deal with Saudi Arabia.

We have tried in this report to shed light on the aspects of this secret and serious battle which is being waged by Israel against the Gulf. The Gulf states are aware, of course, of the dimensions and significance of this battle. Their strong coordination, their constant consultation and their integration within the framework of the Gulf Cooperation Council are some of the means to confront these dangers.

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CSO: 4304/3

PARTY PAPER COMMENTS ON GOVERNMENT'S PEACE PROPOSAL

Kabul HAQIQAT-E ENQELAB-E SAHR in Dari 17 May 81 p 1

[Text] In the last issue we carried the statement by the foreign ministry of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan on the occasion of the passage of a year since the DRA government's famous 14 May peace proposals. The DRA foreign ministry's statement, while clearly and sincerely stressing the search for ways toward a peaceful resolution of conditions created on the perimeter of our country, once again drew the attention of those neighboring countries who are stoning efforts for an early solution of the present situation in the region, particularly its connection with our country's affairs, to their heavy responsibility before history and the fate of the masses of the region. It once again outlined the sincere desire of our revolutionary government to find a logical and peaceful solution to the benefit of the region's people.

In reality our country is deeply desirous of peace, which is a pressing need of the times. It is the immediate need of our people in order that they may build a new society and is the humane need of the masses, and has not spared any effort toward such an end. But there are forces in our region who do not accept the reality of Afghanistan's Revolution and its two-way results for millions of the toiling masses and will not miss any chance to increase tension, intrigue, sedition and plots against us. All the complications of the present situation and the resulting damages are caused by the opportunistic, vengeful and impractical policy of these very reactionary circles and forces of our region.

On 14 May 1980 we clearly announced our readiness to resolve at a conference table with governments of neighboring countries all current major difficulties which have led to the tense situation around Afghanistan.

We made it clear that if during such talks credible guarantees were forthcoming in order to end and to prevent a repetition of aggressions from these territories against our country, the question of the return of the limited number of Soviet troops, who hastened to the help of our people at the request of the legal and responsible authorities of our country, would be resolved.

At various times subsequently these proposals assumed a more complete form and became one of the hard and undeniable realities of international relations, not only on the regional but on a worldwide level.

Recognizing its deep and honorable responsibilities, the revolutionary government of Afghanistan has, by outlining these proposals, carried out its humane and peaceful responsibilities before the peoples of the region and of the world. These proposals were not put forward merely for tactical or demagogic reasons but spring from the deep nature of the policy of our revolutionary government. We have tried many times to bring to discussion these proposals which apparently no one has clearly rejected. The government of Pakistan once or twice has announced its readiness to hold talks through ambiguous and confusing statements which later were found to be hypocritical. But unfortunately it has not taken any practical step toward the start of such talks or an effort to prepare the preliminaries for such discussion and has blindly turned its sight toward the White House and followed its opportunistic policy.

Whenever Pakistan has shown a willingness in this regard even by means of these ambiguous and confused statements, responsible White House authorities have been quick to act in putting obstacles in the way.

We have carried out what we had to do. If neighboring governments really want a peaceful solution of present difficulties existing around Afghanistan they must accept our specific, reasonable and realistic proposals which have been outlined without prior terms and conditions being put on them; otherwise they will not be able to meet their unhealthy goals of creating war and fire behind a heavy curtain of smoke and dust of accusation and ambiguity.

5854

CSO: 4665/1

U.S. IMPERIALISM SEEN AS MAJOR BLOCK TO SOLUTION OF AFGHAN PROBLEM

Kabul ANIS in Dari 21 May 81 pp 4-5

[Text] Not only do the interventions of imperialist quarters, particularly the American Imperialism and its chauvinistic confederates, pose a major impediment to the solution of the Afghan problem, but these interventions have become the fundamental factor of the aggravation of the situation in the region. Imperialism tries to perpetuate the current situation and to use it as an excuse for making threats against other parts of the world and to capitalize on it.

The history of world revolutions shows that since the defeat of colonialism and America's assumption of the leadership of neo-colonialism, most of the international tensions have been triggered and stoked by America and its cohorts in order to protect the interests of imperialist monopolies and in order to prevent the progress of revolutions.

Since the inception of the victory of the April Revolution, the anti-revolutionary stand of the United States of America and its allies against the Afghanistan Revolution has been clear. This stand is clearly reflected in its immediate worries evinced from the other side of the world.

America has made its stand more hostile and has stretched out its warmongering hand from the other side of the world under the cloak of support for the Moslems of Afghanistan (!) and has launched an undeclared war against Afghanistan with the help of its accomplices. However, the progress of the April Revolution, which entered a new phase with the collapse of the despotism of Amin and his criminal gang, has become more certain, and in addition, the anti-militarist and anti-imperialist movement of the people of Pakistan has grown perceptibly, so much so that the expanding tension in the region makes the need for a political solution increasingly felt each day.

True to its revolutionary and peace-seeking policy, not only has the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan been making every effort since the early days of the victory of the April Revolution for establishing peace and stability in the region and for creating understanding and close ties with neighboring countries such as Iran and Pakistan, but it has also put forth constructive proposals for this purpose after the victory of the new phase of the revolution.

Apprehending its responsibility toward the situation, the Revolutionary Government of Afghanistan has consistently emphasized the creation of mutual understanding which is the key to the solution of the Afghan problem and has called for reciprocal action by the countries interested in the parties to the problem.

The Democratic Republic of Afghanistan demands assurance about the cessation of interventions in the internal affairs of Afghanistan which are being perpetrated by regional reactionaries supported openly by the United States of America and its confederates, upsetting the peaceful life of the people of Afghanistan.

However, the United States and its allies not only prevent creation of understanding aimed at regional peace and stability with ruse and excuse, but they actually exacerbate instability and misunderstanding more than ever.

It is self-evident that apart from the reactionaries themselves, nobody likes a reactionary regime and the people try to overthrow it so that they may take their fate into their own hand through revolutionary change. But at every stage they are bound to run into the animosity of imperialism.

The people of Afghanistan who managed to do exactly that through the victory of the April Revolution, also came up against the same imperialist animosity while the victory of the Afghanistan Revolution had nothing to do with America on the other side of the world.

Under the present circumstances the leadership of the United States of America knows full well that the Afghanistan Revolution is invincible and that the revolutionary system that has been strengthened for the last 3 years is further strengthened daily in its foundations. But since American imperialism and its confederates think that the cessation of their hostile intervention in Afghanistan would be a forfeiture of the excuse of their exploitative interests in other parts of the world, they assess the continuation of the situation through deception of the people of Afghanistan to be in their interest. So, they try to set up hurdles in the way of the solution of the problem of the region.

International Imperialism uses deceptive expressions of support to prevent from returning to Afghanistan those elements who fell for the hostile and venomous propaganda of Imperialism and went to Pakistan. International Imperialism tries to keep these people in the circles of deception away from home so that it can undermine the advancement of the revolution through them and pit the Muslim and toiling people of Afghanistan against one another.

This is due to the antirevolutionary nature of Imperialism. The people of Afghanistan, who realize better and better the nature of the Imperialist plots, know that a revolution cannot progress by embracing the antirevolution and that Imperialism that has always acted against revolutions cannot get along with them.

It is with the knowledge of this reality that the people of Afghanistan place their belief and confidence in their revolutionary leadership against Imperialist plots and fight for the safekeeping of the revolution and its fruits.

The people join the revolutionary fighting lines in increasing numbers and foil the ill-fated plots of Imperialism by their resolute defense of their revolution.

However, the current situation in the region brings the responsibility to the attention of the leaders of the countries interested in the region with increased clarity that they should respond to the interest of their peoples in peace and friendship and to march in the path of creating mutual understanding and, in particular, they should respond favorably to the constructive and initiative proposals of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan which are the guarantor of peace in the region.

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REPORTER FROM PRO-PRC ORGAN VISITS GUERRILLAS

Afghanistan's Holy War

Stockholm GNISTAN in Swedish 10 Apr 81 pp 1, 7-11

[Article by Christer Lundgren]

[Text] In Afghanistan the faithful are fighting in a "jihad," a holy war.

Poorly-armed peasants and nomads are standing up against the world's most efficient war machine. The right to an Islamic state stands against Russian power expansion.

GNISTAN visited the "mujahedin," the Afghan guerrillas. We traveled through the mountains with them and visited towns that had been devastated by Soviet troops.

Read about the guerrilla commander with 3000 men, 50 of them armed; the village chieftain whose five children were killed by Soviet soldiers; maps and facts about the site of the conflict; Sweden's rejection of Afghan refugees; Islam and Afghanistan; Russian and Soviet expansion in Central Asia.

Fighting a Superpower With Empty Hands

We met him a few miles from the border--the 10-year-old boy with the slingshot. He stood in a deep valley in Paktia province. Only a few months earlier Soviet troops had tried to occupy the valley--but the attempt had failed.

Slingshot? We were told it could be used as a weapon. Someone had heard that a Soviet soldier in Kabul was hit in the eye and lost his sight.

Maybe the report of the slingshot in Kabul is true, maybe it is not. And the boy with the slingshot hadn't hit any Soviet soldiers with it.

But the slingshot tells us something about Afghanistan. The same thing guerrilla commander Abdul Qaium Sherifzade who had 3000 men, 50 of them armed, told us:

"The weapons are few, poor and inadequate. But the determination to resist is strong."

Afghanistan is the country no one has succeeded in conquering.

The bus made its way along the rocky riverbeds, uphill all the way, past the last police outposts in Pakistan. From the refugee camp we continued on foot. A camel carried the equipment. After a march lasting several hours we reached the mountain crest marking the true border.

Before us in the haze lay Afghanistan.

The day before we had crowded into a small bus with 15 Afghan partisans--"mujahedin." In disguise we passed seven police checkpoints before reaching our preliminary destination, the town of Paktia near the border, at twilight. This is the site of the district headquarters of Afghanistan's Islamic National Front--the organization responsible for our visit.

In the evening we sat on the floor around an oil lamp and talked about the Soviet war in Afghanistan. The accounts were of unity and resolution, of a shortage of weapons and successful fights against the ungodly Soviet and pro-Soviet troops, of stratagems and of the "shahid," martyrs in the holy war, the "jihad."

Sulimanzay, a colorful informant from the Gardez district in Paktia province, was one of those who spoke:

"When I was in Quetta (a city in Pakistan on the way to Afghanistan's second city, Kandahar) I met an old man who had four sons. They were all mujahedin, and they told him he should stay home and let them fight.

"But one day he met a soldier and attacked him with a club. The soldier thought there were other mujahedin in the vicinity. He was frightened and dropped his gun. When the man ran off with it another soldier shot him in the foot. With his wound and his rifle he came to our organization's headquarters in Quetta."

With stories like this Sulimanzay and the other men kindled each other's courage and spirit of self-sacrifice. The narrator was a "said" (a descendent of Muhammad) and acted as a kind of political commissar in the organization led by Said Ahmed Gailani. His black beard streaked with gray strengthened the impression of forcefulness and affability.

Pressure Cookers Used as Bombs

Another narrator, Aziz Rahman, a young man with curly hair, a neatly-trimmed beard and alert eyes, spoke next. He could have been a radical European student. We later learned he was the son of one of Gailani's political advisers.

He told how the Russians mapped mineral deposits in Afghanistan behind the back of the Afghan authorities, as well as how people with primitive weapons fought the invasion forces.

"In Ghazni there are some narrow streets. When a column passed through the town the people dropped burning mats from the roofs and poured gasoline over the tanks so they caught fire. They also blew up bridges by filling pressure cookers with gasoline, stopping up the vent and placing the containers over a fire underneath a bridge. These 'Afghan bombs' are more efficient than American bombs designed to explode bridges."

Violations Require Revenge

During those evening hours we heard many variations of a theme that would turn up again later on:

"What we need most of all are effective weapons. Missiles that can shoot down Russian combat helicopters. If we just get weapons we can free our country ourselves--and we will give the Russians no peace until Bucharra and Samarkand are free too."

The idea of pursuing the war over the Amu River, which provides a border with the Soviet Union, cannot be found in any political program. But among the people it is a reality. For them history is a living thing. The invasion of Afghanistan is a continuation of Russian expansionism in Central Asia. Historically the Soviet Union is an enemy and the violations of enemies call for revenge--even if it takes a hundred years or more.

Resemble Frogs

The paths leading down from the border pass were thickly strewn with fragments from the most common Russian contact mines. The Mochbel valley, which we entered, is one of the most important communication links with Pakistan used by the guerrillas.

The contact mines look like frogs. They are dropped from helicopters in a "ball with many doors." The doors open halfway to the ground and each one ejects three plastic and aluminum mines, some of them containing chemicals that produce large skin blisters.

At the beginning of February Soviet and government troops tried to capture Mochbel. They threw several hundred vehicles and combat helicopters into a big offensive.

The people hid in caves in the mountains despite the cold winter weather.

Between 5000 and 7000 men fought a bitter battle against the invaders. The conflicts raged one on one, the lightly-armed partisans stormed the mechanized columns on foot. Some were armored.

Children Killed

The Russian tactic is to concentrate attacks on the homes of village chieftains and on schools which often serve as headquarters or meeting places for the

resistance people. In this way they hope to split up the people and isolate the natural leaders.

One of these leaders is Gulpai Khan. In the Mochbel offensive his house was exposed to heavy attacks. We met him in the ruins of his home.

"When the Soviet troops came here many vehicles stopped at our house. We told the children not to leave the house because we were surrounded. They shot at us from down in the valley and we went outside to return their fire.

"Then came artillery fire from another direction and hit the house. Three children died. Later helicopters came and dropped incendiary bombs. The other two children ran out of the house and they died too. In addition more than ten domestic animals were killed and equipment worth a half million Afs was destroyed." (One Swedish krona equals around 10 Afs.)

In the burned-out house lay a Koran wrapped in cloth. It hadn't burned and the glass it rested on hadn't broken. The people saw this as a sign of Allah's greatness and as proof that the fight was a just one.

Seven enemy vehicles were captured and another six were destroyed but recovered by the enemy. The fight for the Mochbel valley lasted 7 days before the invasion forces were driven back to their camp in Khowst, the central area of Paktia province.

After the fighting was over the families were taken across the border into Pakistan. Two children died in the severe cold. Some of the captured vehicles were taken apart and carried across the border in pieces to be used again, some of them in the manufacture of weapons.

Traces of Attacks

The first building we came across when we went down into the valley was a shed that had housed some small businesses in the past. Now only the charred wooden walls remained.

A few scattered farms lay on the mountain slope ahead of us. There we were shown the traces of attacks by combat helicopters--including a bomb that had not been detonated. Deeply embedded in the earth with only the tail fins above ground it remained as a threat hanging over the farm. It could explode at any time and no one knew how to disarm it. Could it be blown up by attaching a long rope to it and having a camel pull on it?

We ate lunch in the village--a simple lunch of millet stew and curdled mutton fat. Hospitality was great as it was everywhere we went. But we noticed that the leader of our group paid for the meal. The resistance movement is not a burden on the people.

Sawmill Standing Idle

Around the farms were small irrigated pieces of green farmland. A sparse sandalwood forest covered the mountainsides. Forestry was the most important industry in the area after agriculture.

Resul Khan was one of the people with us, an influential man in his village.

"We had a nice home, fields and also vehicles which we used to take the timber into Kabul where it was sold. We left all that to live in tents and huts on the other side of the border. But we will fight for our country until the enemy is driven out. I beg your country to help us so we can triumph and create a better life than we had before."

The war has created problems for forestry. The modern German-built sawmill in Jaji stands idle. The shortage of lumber and sawn timber has driven up the price of wood in Kabul from 12 Afs for 7 kilograms before the war to 60 Afs today though incomes remain the same (except that officers' pay has risen from 4-5000 Afs a month to twice as much).

No Wood to Karmal

"We were timber salesmen and took wood and timber to Kabul. We earned good money," said Lajmir Khan in the village of Marichel where we spent the night after a day's march over rocky terrain.

"But if we go to Kabul now they catch us and arrest us. For that reason we can't go on with our trade. They are unbelievers and have no mercy on us."

We were given another reason by Khial Jan, village school teacher:

"We won't take our wood to Kabul because we are fighting the regime of Babrak Karmal and want to set up an Islamic regime in Afghanistan."

The impression they tried to give us was that all normal life had become impossible due to the war, that no forestry activity was possible now. But the truth was obviously not that simple. When we came into Marichel at night we passed three trucks fully loaded with timber. We weren't told where they were going.

"Small quantities of wood are taken across the border to Pakistan," was the only answer we got.

A few days later we took a bus between some towns in Paktia province. The bus driver had just come back from Kabul and was able to tell us about the situation there.

"The government seizes young men by force at night for the army. One evening they waited outside a movie theater and forcibly recruited all the men in the crowd. They don't just take young men, they take every man they can find without

asking whether they have already served their mandatory military service period. They also force their way into houses without asking permission. They have destroyed mosques and are enemies of our religion.

"In the Kartinao and Kutesingi sections of the city bursts of gunfire can be heard every night. Most men are mujahedin and our people think they are sacrificing themselves for a great idea. The people in Afghanistan like those who have left the country want an Islamic regime. Everyone in Kabul says the Soviets must leave Afghanistan right away.

"This is an Islamic country and we do not accept a leadership without religion. A regime of unbelievers has been set up in our country. A proxy government. Who wants to serve as a soldier for people like that? If we had a Moslem regime everyone would voluntarily and without force agree to a mandatory period of military service."

Afghanistan is a very religious country, an economically underdeveloped tribal society with a patriarchal structure. The ideology guiding the resistance fight is in many ways alien to us westerners. This is also true of the subordinate position of women and the social structure.

Of course there are rich and influential men there. But everything is relative. A Swedish worker or small farmer wouldn't dream of living under the conditions prevailing for a "rich man" in an Afghan village. Before the war per capita income in Afghanistan was higher than in the Central African Republic but lower than in Tanzania. In general the Afghan tribal society has more in common with Africa than with industrialized western societies. There may be stronger parallels with the Sweden of Engelbrekt and Gustav Vasa.

Welcomed Daoud

But the people are not opposed to social progress, economic development and a higher standard of living. They welcomed Daoud's coup in 1972. After that people were allowed to work in Iran and Saudi Arabia and send money home to their families in Afghanistan. This flowing in of capital was halted by the Taraki coup in 1978. His ideology was foreign and his policy lowered the people's standard of living.

When we approached the border again we passed a shelter containing an old man and a boy. The old man told the men with us that he was glad to see they had Russians with them, but he soon understood that we were western journalists. When we were ready to leave the boy brought some men forward. They had hidden in ambush but came out when they heard we were not Russians.

Those guiding us told us two German journalists had entered Afghanistan without being escorted by mujahedin. They were taken for Russians and killed. Other journalists had died the same way in the Kabul region.

In the drizzle we trilled up the mountainside. We had come in the spring rainy season when the snow melts and new growth begins.

During the winter things had been hard for the mujahedin. There had been clashes but by and large the enemy had had the initiative. With the snow gone and the rain over the situation would be different.

Russian Skeletons

Wet and perspiring from the hard march, we passed the crest. A few hundred meters over the Pakistan side of the border were the skeletons of two Russian soldiers. Intruders or executed prisoners of war? We never learned the answer.

A little farther down we saw the first clay huts. Simple shelters for refugees who are not registered by the Pakistani authorities and who do not appear in any statistics.

Officially there are over 1.6 million refugees in Pakistan and another half million in Iran. One out of every seven people in Afghanistan has been forced to leave the country.

We had spent a few days in wartorn Afghanistan and we had found out more about the conditions of the resistance struggle. When we came back down to Parachinar we met the head of the organization's headquarters, Inzergol.

"Come back in a month, there will be hard clashes breaking out all over the country," he said.

Mumasila Jarga

Several attempts have been made to create a representative institution that can represent the Afghan people. Mumasila Jarga is an assembly of leaders from all the districts of Afghanistan, a resurrection of the Lowir Jarga, the assembly of chieftains and respected men called together in the past by the king or president in difficult periods.

The provisional Jarga has called for repelling the Russian invasion and it has appealed to the various organizations to unite. Three of the six established Afghan organizations in Pakistan cooperate with the Jarga but the "fundamentalists" dismiss it as a self-appointed assembly without importance.

Inside Afghanistan a new administration is beginning to be formed from the leaders really at the head of the resistance struggle. They also view positively a co-operation with all those resisting the Russian invasion.

I de centrala bergstrakterna (provinserna Bamian, Ghazni, Ghor, Uruzgan, m.fl.) samt provinserna Jauzjan och Balkh i norr är stora områden befriade. En genomsam administration har upprättats för 13 befriade distrikt, bestående av bazara-folket (som är shia muslimer).

Faryab: 400 soldater ur ryngningsarmen anslöt sig nyligen till mujahideen. 6

Herat: Kabul radion har haft flera rapporter om strider

Hazarajat (provinserna Helmand/Uruzgan): Sovjetiska trupper har inte vågat sig in i området på över ett år, men det finns uppgifter om att vietnamesiska soldater opererat där. Ledande organ har valts och egen administration utsetts. 8

Nimruz: Hela provinsen befriad, utom staden Saranj, som mujahideen avskiktligt inte befriad, eftersom man får vapen genom regeringstrupperna där. 9

Helmand-provinsen kontrolleras nästan helt av motståndsrörelsen. Sovjet kontrollerar Lashkarqand och Gushk som är belägrade. 10

Utman för Kandahar: Sovjet bygger en stor militärflygplats och uppläddar enligt uppgift ca 5 000 kadrer för upprorsverksamhet i Pakistan och Iran. 11

Gränsen mot Pakistan och Iran är helt öppen. Ryssarna försöker ibland skära av förbindelserna genom att släppa ned trampolinor från luften. 12

Kandahar: Staden behålls till 80 procent av mujahideen. Regeringen kontrollerar bara de officiella byggnaderna och stadens centrum. 18 februari gick de till omfattande angrepp mot stadsdelen Makhdi. En reportagegrupp från fransk TV befann sig i staden. 13

Vägen mellan Kabul och Jalalabad: Attacker mot militärkonvojer. 14

Provinsen Lowgar: Mellan Kabul och Gardez attacker mot militärkonvojer. Tillsammans med jakt efter motståndarna. 15

staden Ghazni: Attacker mot militärkonvojer. 16

Paktia-provinsen: I början av februari gjorde Sovjet ett mislyckat försök att ta Makhdi en daglig nära gränsen (se rapport i detta nummer). 17

Kholes (Samangand-provinsen): Härda strider i mitten av 1980.

Provinserna Takhar, Kunduz: 3
Tillsammans i Kabul-radion om strider under årets första månad.

Wakhan: Inom strategiskt viktiga korridor mot Pamir som skapades som buffert mellan de brittiska och ryska imperierna och som gränsar till Kina har Sovjet nu befäst kontrollen över. Det finns uppgifter om raketrampor för kärnvapen i området.

Nuristan (provinserna Laghman-Konark): Efter ett mislyckat försök i maj 1980 har de sovjetiska trupperna inte vågat sig in i området. Egen administration.

Kabul: Befolkningen mobiliserats till omfattande motstånd. Stora demonstrationer, skottlossning, attentat och strider förklarade mer ofta. 25 februari, på årsdagen av en omfattande manifestation förra året, dödades 5 000 människor förklarade livet genomfördes en stor strejk och demonstration. Elva organisationer hade enats, däribland landets enda kvinnorganisation, Afghanistan's kvinnors revolutionära förbund. 80 procent av stadens affärer var stängda, men på måndagen kom ryska soldater och sköt upp ihop med kadrer.

I mitten av mars drabbade Qargha armén av regimens 12 divisioner) samman med fälthavarna Babar Jan, begärde avsked. Regimens industrifabrikare Sediq Ferhang har hoppats att till New Delhi. Strider mellan de rivaliserande prosovetiska partigrupperingarna jarcham och khaly pågått upphörigt. 18

Key:

1. In the central mountain regions (Bamiyan, Ghazni, Ghor, Uruzgan and other provinces) as well as in Jouzjan and Balkh provinces in the north large areas have been liberated. A joint administration has been set up for 33 liberated districts populated by the Hazara people (who are Shi-ite Moslems).
2. Kholm (Samangand province). Heavy conflicts in mid-March.
3. Takhar and Kunduz provinces. Frequent reports on Kabul radio of conflicts in the first months of the year.
4. Wakhan. The Soviets have now gained control over this strategically important corridor to Pamir, created as a buffer between the British and Russian empires and bordering on China. There are reports of missile ramps for nuclear weapons in this area.
5. Nuristan (Laghman-Konarha provinces). After an unsuccessful attempt in May 1980 Soviet troops have not dared entered the area. It has its own administration.

[Key continued on following page]

6. Paryab. Recently 400 soldiers from the government army joined the mujahedin.
7. Herat. Kabul radio has reported several conflicts here.
8. Hazarajat (Helmand-Uzurgan provinces). Soviet troops have not dared enter the area for more than a year but there are reports that Vietnamese soldiers are operating there. Leading organs have been elected and a separate administration appointed.
9. Nimruz. Entire province liberated except for the city of Saranj which the mujahideen deliberately chose not to liberate since they get arms from the government troops there.
10. Helmand province is controlled almost entirely by the resistance movement. The Soviets control Lashkargar and Grishk which are besieged.
11. Outside Kandahar the Soviets are building a large military air base and according to reports they are training around 5000 Baluchis for rebel activities in Pakistan and Iran.
12. The border with Pakistan and Iran is entirely open. From time to time the Russians try to cut off communications by dropping contact mines from the air.
13. Kandahar. The city is 80 percent controlled by the mujahideen; the government controls only official buildings and the center of the city. On 18 February they made an extensive attack on the Maladjat part of the city. A reporting team from French TV was in the city at the time.
14. Highway between Kabul and Jalalabad. Attacks on military convoys.
15. Logar province. Attacks on military convoys between Kabul and Gardez. Frequent "clean-up actions" with searches for resistance men.
16. In the city of Ghazni, attacks on military convoys.
17. Paktia province. In the beginning of February the Soviets made an unsuccessful attempt to take Mochbel, a long valley near the border. (See report in this issue.)
18. Kabul. The people are mobilized in extensive resistance. Big demonstrations, gunshots, attacks and clashes occur frequently. On 25 February, the anniversary of a widespread demonstration the year before in which 5000 people lost their lives, there was a big strike and demonstration. Eleven organizations had united on this including the country's only women's organization, the Revolutionary League of Women in Afghanistan. Some 80 percent of city businesses were closed but at noon the Russian soldiers came and shot the locks off with handguns. In the

middle of March the Qargha army (one of the regime's 12 divisions) came to blows with Russian soldiers. One of the highest military commanders, Babar Jan, submitted his resignation. The regime's industrial adviser, Sediq Ferhang, defected to New Delhi. The conflict between the rival pro-Soviet party groups, the Parcham and the Khalq, is still going on.

Abdul's 3000 Mujahedin Fighting With 50 Weapons

"I am commander for two mujahedin committees, one in the Mohammad Agha district in Lowgar province and the other in Kabul. In all there are 3000 mujahedin under this command but only 50 have weapons. We have 15 machine pistols (Stengel model), 10 automatic rifles, five pistols and one anti-tank gun as well as mines. Our tactic is to use the methods of guerrilla warfare."

The speaker was Abdul Qaium Sherifzade, one of the men leading the resistance struggle in Afghanistan.

"Our weapons are very simple, we have no modern weapons. No anti-aircraft guns at all. We need modern weapons in order to shoot down combat helicopters, tanks and jet planes. The weapons we now have are inadequate."

We have heard this hundreds of times: We're fighting a superpower with empty hands. We need help in the form of modern and effective weapons.

An American we talked to in Peshawar thought it sounded like an old record that had become stuck in a groove--and there is something to what he said. But what they told us happens to be the truth.

The Soviet M24 helicopters (often called Hind-D helicopters in the West) are modern and effective. The underside is made of titanium and cannot be damaged by rifle shots; missiles are needed to shoot the aircraft down. The crew consists of two men, a pilot and a gunner in charge of a machine-gun, bombs and missiles. The aircraft is feared but the guerrillas have managed to shoot down or capture a few of these helicopters.

There are sharp variations in the tactics of the guerrillas but in general they are effective. Attacks are made on the mountain villages but the cities are not left in peace either. They have established regional coordination. For instance if clashes occur within the military in one place, fighting is concentrated there. This eases the pressure on places elsewhere in the district, providing an opportunity to develop the struggle there too.

One of the widely-held ideas about the war is that the people of Afghanistan are split up into warring factions. That is true with qualifications. Everyone familiar with the situation in the country talks about the strong unity against the Russians.

In the fighting for Mochbel 5-6000 mujahedin took part from three groups of people--Mochbel, Mangal and Jhalji. Coordination appears to have been good and effective.

Napalm Against Civilians

In the Mochbel fighting the Soviets used napalm bombs among other things. Napalm, poison gas and antipersonnel bombs are according to many witnesses common elements in the Russian warfare in Afghanistan.

Four incendiary bombs were dropped in that conflict according to our informants. One did not explode. Two of the bombs weighed 140 kg, two were smaller. The writing on the bombs had been deciphered and it was clear they contained napalm.

Napalm is a burning substance that sticks to fields, houses, people and animals and burns at a high temperature. Reports of napalm come from almost everywhere in Afghanistan.

Various types of poison gas are also used. Most common are tear gas and other types of gas not directly lethal in themselves but there are also reports of a gas that first paralyzes and then kills after a few weeks or months. Such lethal gas has been used in Hazarajat, some parts of Kunar province as well as in Anardara (in Badkhis province) and Paktiar.

Frogs

Antipersonnel bombs come in various models. Contact mines of various types ("frogs," "butterflies," toys, pens, weapons, etc.) have been reported. In the areas we visited a green or grayish brown "frog" was a common occurrence.

A type of fragmentation bomb called "shrapnel" is also common. These are fired by heavy artillery on the ground or from armed helicopters. Each bomb releases a quantity of projectiles of different kinds (balls, spikes and sharp points, irregular disks). These projectiles are covered with chemicals that cause wounds that do not heal, become infected and hurt.

These various types of weapons, napalm, gas and antipersonnel bombs are often used in "punitive actions" against the civilian population.

They are in conflict with international conventions and agreements banning weapons causing unnecessary suffering. Thus it is obvious that by using these tactics the Soviet Union has been guilty of war crimes.

Letter to a Fallen Soviet Soldier

At the end of October or the beginning of November last year a noncommissioned officer, Grigorij Pavlovitch Nazatjuk, was killed in southern Afghanistan. He was 33 years old.

A few days earlier he had received a letter from his wife living in the Khmel-nitskiy district of Ukraine, a letter found by the guerrillas on the body of the fallen soldier.

His wife wrote:

"You're sad that I don't write nice loving letters. But what am I supposed to write? You know what life is like here. It's the kind of life that must make people malicious and spiteful. And every day is the same.

"I miss you so much I can hardly stand it any longer. I don't know how I am going to handle waiting all year. Always waiting--if not for a letter then for leave. And all around me I see others and I get envious and angry.

"I lie down at night and can't get to sleep for half the night, I remember all the things we said to each other as one friend to another."

She tells about their daughter Alona, she thinks she will do well in school. But at the same time she expresses concern about daily life--will they get an apartment, will they manage to obtain enough food?

The letter concludes:

"We send many loving kisses! I'll answer every letter from you. Write to me every day and I will answer you! We send kisses!"

Did she get an answer? Or was the only answer the report that her husband had been killed?

'Border Defense,' Russian Style

Stockholm GNISTAN in Swedish 10 Apr 81 pp 12-13

[Article by Kristian Gerner, Soviet expert in Lund]

[Text] Bukhara 1868. Merv 1884. Afghanistan 1979. These are some dates commemorating Russian expansion in Central Asia.

"The Russian leaders, just like today's Soviet leaders, saw the occupation of new areas as defensive steps against the other big powers. But the consequences have been the same, a steady expansion of Russian power at the expense of other people."

So writes Soviet expert Kristian Gerner.

The official Soviet line on its policy in Afghanistan is that the Soviet Union is providing help, that it is assisting a socialist brother land to counter further aggression, to counter attacks from the United States, China, Pakistan, Egypt and Israel. (PRAVDA, 18 January 1980)

In February 1980 and at the Soviet CP congress this February Brezhnev stressed that the imperialist war against the Afghan revolution is a threat to the southern

border of the Soviet Union. Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko explained (KOMMUNIST, no 1, 1981) that a disruption of the military balance (parity) between socialism and capitalism cannot be tolerated. Evidently it was felt that this balance was being disturbed by developments in Afghanistan under Amin in 1979.

I think we can best understand the motive behind the Soviet seizure of power in Afghanistan if we take Brezhnev's and Gromyko's statements seriously while bearing in mind that the word "socialism" in Gromyko's statement should be read as "Russia" or the "Soviet Union," which is the same thing as far as Moscow is concerned.

Russia Extended

Recently prominent people in the Soviet Union have stressed in various ways Russia's historical importance and greatness. It is reasonable to view today's Soviet foreign policy as a continuation of the old Russian one. Territorial expansion is characteristic of this policy but it is of a defensive nature, aimed at protecting Russia's borders.

Ever since the 16th century when Ivan IV conquered the khanates of Kazan and Astrachan Russia has expanded eastward. The conquest of Siberia in the 17th century and of what is now called Central Asia in the 18th and 19th centuries did not follow any previously set plan. Tradersmen and fleeing serfs settled in Siberia--the Russian authorities followed with administration and troops. Local military officers, with the backing of the Ministry of War in Saint Petersburg, conquered one khanate after another in Central Asia--and the czarist government confirmed that the new areas now belonged to Russia. Tashkent in 1865, Bukhara in 1868, Chiva in 1873 and Kokand in 1876.

The Russian Foreign Ministry did not want to give the rest of the world, especially England which with its presence in India was in direct competition with Russia for control of Central Asia, the impression that they were pursuing an active policy of conquest.

Therefore when Russian troops occupied Samarkand in 1868 they said that the occupation would be ended "as soon as possible." As we all know the Russians are still there. Samarkand lies in the Soviet Republic of Uzbekistan.

Afghanistan lay at the meeting point of the expanding Russian and British empires. In 1878 the Russians tried to keep the British away from their borders by encouraging Afghanistan's ruler, Zhir Ali, to oppose British demands for influence. Ali did not get any military support from Russia and lost the ensuing war with the British. Afghanistan came under British control. The Russians decided to consolidate their positions in Bukhara and Chiva.

Afghanistan a Buffer State

The Russians continued to defend their new borders by incorporating Turkish areas east of the Caspian Sea in Russia. In 1881 the Turks won a victory at the battle

of Geok Tepe. In 1884 Merv was conquered and Afghanistan was approached from the northwest. Relations with the British, who felt their empire threatened, became critical.

However, the British received no support from the other great powers--Bismarck's Germany and its allies Austria-Hungary and Italy as well as France--for a military attack on Russia. The conflict was settled by peaceful means through a treaty in 1885 in which the boundary between Russia and Afghanistan was drawn in such a way that Russia received most of the territory it laid claim to.

In 1895 an agreement was also reached on boundaries in the northeast, in the Pamir area and in 1905 the "buffer state" of Afghanistan was assigned the so-called Wachen area which drove in like a wedge between the Russian Central Asia and the British India--in this way they avoided having the two empires come into direct contact with each other via common borders.

Green Light for Soviet Union

In the 1920's the young Soviet state supported King Amanullah's policy which was aimed at freeing the country from British dependence and modernizing Afghanistan. Amanullah's overthrow by Afghan groups opposed to this domestic policy dealt a setback to the Soviet attempt to gain influence in the country.

When Daoud Khan first came to power in Afghanistan through the 1953 coup, Soviet help was given the green light once again. From 1954 on Afghanistan received substantial economic and military assistance from the Soviet Union. The cooperation was crowned with a friendship and assistance agreement after the communist coup in Afghanistan in 1978.

In my opinion when seen from a historical perspective the Soviet power takeover in Afghanistan is not a break with earlier Russian and Soviet foreign policy. Since Moscow succeeded in freeing itself from the Mongol rule (1480) the Russians adopted in a manner of speaking the leadership ambitions over the entire realm the Mongols had had, the one they had established in Central Asia with the help of various Turkish peoples.

The result was a multinational empire in which non-Russian peoples had to be protected from harmful foreign influences across the border, from tribal kinsmen. The best way to protect the borders was to move them forward.

In the 19th century military and strategic reasons for expansion became important. The main thing was to counter British expansion in Central Asia. In addition it was possible to make advances in this area for a long time with little trouble. It was not until there was a threat to Afghanistan--as the British saw it--that open conflict occurred.

Russians Used to Incorporating Others

Thus the Russians are used to incorporating other people into their realm, people with other languages, other cultures and other religions, without regarding this

for a moment as being a form of imperialism. They don't tackle strong nations but expand their sphere of power when neighboring states are weak and threaten to become bases for a powerful Russian opponent--England in the 19th century, the United States and China today.

In 1868 Russia gave assurances that it would withdraw from Samarkand as soon as possible. The Soviet leaders have stated they will pull troops out of Afghanistan as soon as possible. They are aware this could take centuries.

No plans were worked out for the conquest of Central Asia in the 19th century but wherever they came they stayed. It is extremely likely that they have come to Afghanistan to stay.

But just as one cannot show that the Russian government cherished plans to conquer Afghanistan back in the 19th century, one cannot charge that Soviet leaders today are planning further expansions of power in Central Asia.

Iran or Pakistan would not become the object of Soviet military concern until these nations threatened to fall apart entirely due to internal political divisions while at the same time there was no danger that American or Chinese military moves would be made to counter a Soviet action.

Forgot Symbolic Value

In 1979 the Soviet leaders judged it necessary to protect their borders in classic Russian style--its border with Afghanistan is 2400 km long--through territorial expansion, by backing a very friendly regime in a neighboring state. They calculated--correctly--that the United States was not politically strong enough to intervene militarily in what is from an American point of view a remote mountain country.

Evidently the Soviet leaders didn't give a thought to Afghanistan's symbolic value. For Russian seizure of power awakens old memories for the British and the Anglo-Saxon world. During the 19th century conflict between Russia and the British Empire the Russian policy on Afghanistan was depicted as extremely aggressive and as an indication that Russia wanted control over India and world domination.

The prominent publicist Friedrich Engels--who wrote for the European and American press together with Marx--warned back in 1858 of the Russian expansion policy: unless there was opposition by England not many decades would pass before one could hear the "Muscovites pounding on the gateway to India." Russia was becoming a threat to both India and China. (Marx-Engels, "Werke" [Dietz 1963], Vol 12, pp 590, 625.)

Russian Thinking

Making an effort to understand the Soviet motives behind the invasion of Afghanistan by viewing it in the light of traditional Russian foreign policy is not the

same thing as defending any of it. In addition even this understanding must be hedged with reservations. We don't really know how they reasoned in Saint Petersburg in 1884 or in Moscow in 1979, since neither the Czarist nor the Soviet diplomatic papers are available in complete enough form for research.

We must be content to draw conclusions based on Russian and Soviet foreign policy behavior. Even if the Russian/Soviet leaders themselves regard their foreign policy as defensive, as a defense of Russia/socialism, the result has been an expansion of Russian power at the expense of other people.

Allah Factor in Policy

Stockholm GNISTAN in Swedish 10 Apr 81 p 13

[Article by Jan Samuelsson]

[Text] Jan Samuelsson is chairman of the working group for the Afghanistan Tribunal. He received his doctorate in 1975 with a dissertation on "Islam in Afghanistan" and visited the country in 1971. The dissertation can be obtained for 50 kronor from Jan Samuelsson, telephone: 0753/50091.

If one is to single out one factor as the most important in Afghanistan's policy it would have to be Islam. Some 99 percent of the inhabitants are Moslems. Most are deeply religious.

So writes Jan Samuelsson, who received a doctorate for his dissertation on Islam and Afghanistan.

In the 7th century Islam reached the area where Afghanistan is now in the wake of Arabic invasion armies. At that time the country was regarded by Arabs as part of the Persian Khorasan. At that time the area was dominated by Buddhism, Hinduism, Zoroastrianism and various primitive religions.

In 870 the Arabs gained a tighter military grip over the region and Islam then started to spread rapidly. Ever since, Islam has had a strong position in Afghanistan. The Ghaznavid dynasty which was founded in 962 was the first big Islamic state formation in Afghanistan. The Ghaznavids belonged to the Sunnite part of Islam which since that time has dominated religious life in Afghanistan.

But the country wasn't really entirely Islamicized until the end of the 19th century when Abdur Rahman Shah conquered the people in eastern Afghanistan now known as the Nuristanis. The Nuristanis are a small fraction of the population of the country.

Some 99 Percent Moslems

Almost all Afghans are Moslems. A common estimate in this context is 99 percent. ✓ Around 80 percent of the Afghan Moslems are Sunnis, the rest are Shi'ites. Christianity is not represented among the native population of the country. The largest of the non-Islamic groups are the Hindus. They are found mainly in the capital, Kabul, as well as in the Jalalabad area. The Jewish religion is also represented in the country. There are very few Jews and they can be found mainly in Kabul.

The doctrine adhered to by the majority of Afghan Shi'ites corresponds to the doctrine prevalent in Iran. In general the Afghan and Iranian Shi'ites are very close to each other--in terms of religion and language and to some extent ethnic background and politics as well.

During the shah's period in Iran the Iranians supported their Afghan fellow believers economically, for instance by paying for the construction of a large mosque (more precisely, a "takiya khana") in Kabul.

As mentioned above the Shi'ites are a minority of the population (about 20 percent) but they have complete freedom to practice their religion in Afghanistan.

Mullahs Shape Public Opinion

In Afghanistan those who are learned in Islamic law and the Koran are called "mullahs." There is no fixed uniform education for mullahs. A mullah's social position depends on personal qualities--learning, religious piety, etc. Regarded as a group the mullahs are the most important shapers of public opinion in Afghanistan. In the villages where most of the population lives they are often the only shapers of public opinion.

If one wanted to single out one factor as the most important in the political life of Afghanistan it would be Islam. An overwhelming majority of the population is deeply religious even in comparison with the population of a country like Pakistan. As mentioned before the dominant shapers of opinion are the mullahs. The attitude of the mullahs toward a modernization of Afghan society can be summarized as follows. The mullahs are opposed to reforms regarded as a direct threat to the position of Islam in the country. These include primarily reforms in education, such as the limiting of instruction in the Koran in favor of more secular education and appointing new school teachers who are often not mullahs.

Islamic Clothing

Does that mean that the religious leaders are opposed to all social change?

It does not.

The reforms based on an Islamic foundation and given Islamic "clothing" are not opposed by the mullahs. It is quite possible to implement a reform program

within the framework of an Islamic society. One can generalize somewhat and say that under the regent period of Mohammed Zaher Shah reforms were carried out within an Islamic framework. Therefore it was politically possible to implement these reforms.

When Daoud seized power the Islamic framework started to crumble and a fundamental opposition arose between the policy formed by the tiny intellectual elite group in Kabul and the one preferred by the vast majority of the people living around the country.

By failing to respect the ideas of the vast majority of the people the elitist regime in Kabul dug its own political grave, while at the same time providing the Soviet Union with the political pretext that it was necessary to enter Afghanistan "to rescue the social reforms"--an erroneously planned and clumsily implemented reform program that led to the downfall of Afghanistan.

In Sweden as in other western countries there seems to be a pronounced anti-Islamic attitude. Islam is often regarded here as the equivalent of backwardness and the suppression of women. And of course we should not close our eyes to the fact that there is some foundation to these concepts. The western news reporting of the events in Iran also provided fresh fuel to the anti-Islamic attitudes in the western world.

But the interesting thing is that the nations of the Third World do not regard Islam in this negative way but view it as an ally in their defense against imperialism, whether Russian or western imperialism. The question now is whether Islam can become the factor uniting the various Afghan liberation movements in a struggle against the imperialism represented in this instance by the Soviet Union.

Sweden Rejects Afghan Refugees

Stockholm GNISTAN in Swedish 10 Apr 81 p 14

[Article by Thomas Kanger]

[Text] There are now 1.7 million Afghans crowded into the refugee camps in Pakistan. And each month another 100,000 arrive. Russian terrorism has created the world's largest refugee problem.

But when Sweden received an inquiry about accepting five (5) refugees the Immigration Authority said no. And it was not just any old no. It was a matter of principle. It means other refugees applying in the future will also be turned down.

"We don't want to give the impression that Sweden is an open door," said Tord Palmlund, general director of the Immigration Authority.

About 100,000 people now flee each month from the terror and bombing in Afghanistan. They cross the border into Pakistan. Most are townspeople who would like nothing better than to return to their own land.

Intellectuals make up a very small number of them. Some of these are now trying to continue their westward journey, mainly to West Germany and the United States.

Last summer five intellectuals applied for entrance and residence permits in Sweden. The applications were made through the local representative of the UN Refugee Commission in Pakistan.

"They applied on political grounds," said Per Lilja of the Immigration Authority. "But we turned them down. Our position was taken as a matter of principle; we decided not to accept refugees from Afghanistan. This means we will not be issuing entrance permits on an organized basis.

"The reason is that we have commitments elsewhere in the world. We have a refugee quota of 1250 and government directives instruct us to take them primarily from Latin America."

Only Acute Cases

With the rejection of the applications a directive was sent to the Swedish Embassy in Islamabad, the capital of Pakistan. In it the Immigration Authority gave the embassy guidelines to follow with regard to refugees wanting to come to Sweden:

"The Immigration Authority does not feel the situation for Afghan refugees in Pakistan is such that applications for residence permits should be encouraged. If Afghan refugees apply to Sweden their applications should be channeled through UNHCR (the UN Refugee Commission) in Geneva which takes care of coordinating and priority setting in the area of refugee affairs. In principle this applies even in urgent cases." (Permit Office 1980-08-19, Journal No. 211-80-4421.)

"This means we can only take refugees who are in acute danger," Per Lilja said.

The directive is signed by Per Lilja and department head Bjorn Weibo. But the general director of the Immigration Authority, Tord Palmlund, also took part in the decision. He put a "humanitarian" interpretation on the authority's rejection of Afghan refugees:

"Our basic position is that it is unfair for us or other industrialized lands to pick out from the refugees the well-educated people who are needed there. They need doctors and teachers, it is better that they stay in the camps and help the other refugees.

"We are rejecting the idea of immigration in other words, although we will look at individual cases if they are recommended by the Refugee Commission. We do not want to give the impression that Sweden is an open door. Anyway it's up to Pakistan to take care of them since that is where they went when they fled."

At the same time the Immigration Authority barred Swedish embassies from issuing 3-month tourist visas to Afghans.

No Formal Decision

The decision to bar Afghan refugees was made entirely by the Immigration Authority. The government has made no formal decision on the matter. But Per Lilja confirmed that the decision not to issue residence permits to Afghan refugees is in accordance with the views of the government:

"The members of the government share our view. They have made no protest about the decision."

No fear that Sweden will be "invaded" by Afghan refugees lies behind the negative stand of the Immigration Authority. The applications from the five refugees were the only ones received by the Immigration Authority except for those of around 25 Afghans who came to Sweden on their own.

"We have not received any inquiries about accepting refugees from Afghanistan from the Refugee Commission in Geneva," said Immigration Minister Karin Andersson.

This was confirmed by a responsible authority in Geneva:

"We have not made any requests to the Swedish government about accepting refugees," Nicholas Keller of the Refugee Commission told GNISTAN over the phone.

Thus all it took was five individuals who wanted to escape the miseries of refugee life for Swedish authorities to cut off all Afghan refugees.

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CSO: 8050/1272

INSURGENTS STEP UP RESISTANCE AGAINST SOVIETS, KARMAL

Overflow at Kabul Hospitals

Quetta BALUCHISTAN TIMES in English 28 May 81 pp 1, 6

[Text] London, May 27--The twelfth division of Afghan army and the Soviet forces stationed in Jalalabad have strained relations these days. In spite of Babrak Karmal's personal intervention, the tension among the forces has not subsided.

A special correspondent of Agency Afghan Press has reported from Jalalabad that the Afghan forces had refused to take part in the operations in the areas of Sarkharood, Chaparhar and the southern and south-western parts of Sherzad. These areas had been in Mujahideen's control since beginning of the winter. The Soviets had planned to bomb the areas and send a large number of tanks to start a major operation. The Afghan army officers raised the objection that Mujahideen did not have the control of big towns for long. Hence, there was no use killing thousands of people and indulge in the bloody operations.

In view of the tense situation prevailing between the two forces, Babrak Karmal had recently undertaken a visit to Jalalabad. However, the Afghan officers continue to stick to their stand.

Meanwhile the government hospitals in Kabul have refused to receive further wounded and dead Soviet soldiers.

In the city's five big hospitals including 'Shafa Khana' Qawa-e-Markaz No. 1, 2 and 3, Shafa Khana Qazir Akbar Khan and Chahar Sad Bistar Shafa Khana, the rooms and verandas are jam-packed with wounded.

The Agency sources have reported from the Afghan capital that the administration was informed on May 17 from Chahar Sad Bistar Shafa Khana that there was no space for a single dead body in the hospital moritorium. From this hospital alone, as many as 1500 coffins were despatched to the Soviet Union last week. These dead bodies were brought from Zabul and Paghman. It seemed that often the dead bodies were brought so hurriedly that the blood was seen dripping down the vehicles on the roads of Wazir Akbar Khan area.--AAP

Raid on Airport

Lahore THE PAKISTAN TIMES in English 6 Jun 81 p 10

[Text]

LONDON, June 5: The Mujahideen equipped with rocket launchers and guns made a surprise raid on Jalalabad Airport on May 29 and returned safely after killing two Soviet soldiers and destroying a tank reports Agency Afghan Press.

Jalalabad base is these days centre of air operations against Mujahideen in the Provinces of Nangarhar, Kunar and Laghman and a large number of gun ship helicopters are stationed there to take part in the air attacks. An attack with gun-ship helicopters was made on the Mujahideen's headquarter at Tora Borah in Nangarhar Province on May 27 but scared of the anti aircraft fire the helicopters disappeared.

The Soviet helicopters recently fired toy bombs at Tangi Sulaman Khel near Pakistan borders in which several persons were killed and injured.

In Deh Bala Sub-Division of Nangarhar Province, the Mujahideen killed six soldiers of Karmal force and set three tents on fire. In the same Province in an attack at Ghani Khel's army camp, Mujahideen killed 13 soldiers of the regular Afghan army (Militia). The Mujahideen used a mortar gun and destroyed a jeep and a heavy vehicle. Three army men were killed in Chaparhar area in the Province.

It is to be mentioned here that the officers and soldiers of the army division deployed in Jalalabad had recently opposed the brutal operation of the Soviet forces. The forcibly recruited soldiers called 'Askar' and their officers called 'Zabi' had taken part in the opposition and now they have been replaced by militia in the operations against Mujahideen in Nangarhar Province.

The Mujahideen made a attack on Yaqubi, an Afghan Army post in Paktia Province, 25 KM. away from Pakistan borders destroying two tanks and killing the 9-man crew of tanks. The tanks had been airdropped by helicopters to launch operation against Mahgai tribe.

The Agency Afghan Press Quetta Office reports that on the night of May 30, the Mujahideen stormed the Kandahar jail seizing sizeable quantities of arms and ammunition and arresting a Karmal soldier.

In the last week of May during encounters in Kandahar City, seven civil and military officers of Karmal administration were killed. Twelve Afghan soldiers surrendered their arms to Mujahideen when they were encircled. These days Ridgah and Jodah Sangi Hamam areas of the Kandahar City are the centre of guerrilla activities often in the night time.

Women Attack Soviet-Karmal Force

Lahore THE PAKISTAN TIMES in English 7 Jun 81 p 8

[Text] New Delhi, June 6--A Soviet-Afghan Government assault force in Central Afghanistan has suffered 25 per cent casualties and retreated bruised and bloodied from thousands of counter-attacking Mujahideen and villagers, including women, a delayed report from Kabul said yesterday night.

The fighting turned the Ghorband Valley, 90 kilometers North-west of Kabul, into a graveyard of Russians and pro-Soviet Afghans said the information from a Kabul source who in the past has been accurate.

It estimated that 300 of the 1,200 Soviet troops and Afghan Communist militia who entered the valley in mid-May were killed and more than 200 Russian and Government tanks and other vehicles were destroyed. Insurgents and civilian casualties were not given.

The attack force, trying to push westward to insurgents-held Bamian Province, was cut off and surrounded on May 16 by insurgent band who blew up bridges and commanded the mountain tops, an earlier report from Kabul said.

The Russians and militia retreated eastward out of the valley on May 27 after several days of battle with up to 10,000 insurgents, tribesmen and men and women villagers, some using swords and sticks, Friday's report said.

Another report from Kabul said Soviet forces had unleashed a storm of anger among the Muslim populace by destroying the last three large mosques still intact in the rubble villages along the main road from Kabul to Charikar, 70 kilometers to the north.

The mosques apparently were shelled in reprisal for a May 25 rocket attack by guerrillas hiding in a mosque at Kalakan that cost the Russians 10 destroyed trucks and more than 30 killed or wounded soldiers, the report said.

The WASHINGTON POST correspondent adds: "Spurred by a growing number of such attacks the guerrillas say, their morale is higher than at any point since the Soviets occupied their country with more than 80,000 troops. Although they realise that their holy war could continue indefinitely, their confidence has been boosted by the fact that against all odds, they have been able to challenge the strength and one of the super-powers."

Describing his days journey across the country to the Kabul-Jalalabad Road, Van Lynden says, "We passed through valley after valley that appeared to be in complete control of the rebels."

He says: "Witnessing the ambush from 100 yards off the road, on the opposite side of mountain face, all my worst fears about the capabilities of the Afghan guerrillas seemed to have come true. Although better armed than at the time of the Soviet invasion in December 1979 they did not look overly confident with the modern weaponry.

"But within a matter of seconds it was proved devastatingly wrong, as both the Soviet-made armoured vehicles lay belly-up and blackened."

According to another report, in the broad daylight on the heavily fortified Kabul Airport on May 26, a bullet fired by a guerrilla hit the head of a Parchami officer killing him on the spot.

The same evening the houses of two Parchamis were put on fire by the freedom fighters. The same night the Mujahideen occupied Customs House at Jalalabad Road. The Mujahideen snatched guns from 10 soldiers stationed to protect the offices, while four soldiers joined them. Six soldiers were unarmed and confined in a room. After several hours stay Mujahideen returned to their places.

On May 28, the Mujahideen attacked a Soviet army convoy coming to the capital through the hills adjacent to Kabul killing 21 Soviet soldiers and disappearing within minutes. The three goods vehicles and 2 armoured vehicles were damaged.--APP/AAP.

Destruction of Soviet-Karmal Force

Lahore THE PAKISTAN TIMES in English 8 Jun 81 p 12

[Text] New Delhi, June 7--Afghan Mujahideen nearly wiped out a Soviet-Government attack force in the Ghorband valley north-west of Kabul in late May, a traveller from Afghanistan said yesterday.

Ambushing and raiding the attackers at every turn, the Mujahideen knocked out three MI-24 helicopter gunships, 23 tanks and six armoured vehicles and inflicted very heavy casualties, said the traveller, an Afghan who declined use of her name.

Information received from Kabul on Friday said thousands of counter-attacking Mujahideen, tribesmen and men and women villagers, some using swords and sticks, turned the valley into a Government graveyard, killing an estimated 300 of the attack force made up of 1,200 Soviet soldiers and Communist Party militia.

Neither report gave freedom-fighters or civilian casualties.

The Mujahideen are celebrating with joy over the outcome of the fighting at Ghorband, the traveller said.

Fighting between Afghan Mujahideen and Soviet backed Government troops was continuing in Herat after Mujahideen occupied an area of an unidentified city in that region for several hours on Thursday, a Mujahideen spokesman said here yesterday.

Clashes between Kabul forces and Mujahideen were also continuing in Kandahar, the spokesman for the Islamic Movement of Afghanistan said.

No casualty figures were released, but the spokesman said Mujahideen destroyed four Soviet Afghan tanks in Herat.

Another report adds:

The Mujahideen stormed Kandahar airport on June 3 and destroyed two MIG-21 planes.

Rocket launchers and guns were used in the attack. One plane was turned into debris on the runway, while the second one took off and hardly covered small height when it succumbed to the gunfire. Its debris fell at the end of the runway in the Kulcha Abad, a nearby locality. All the crew members were killed.

In two other operations in Kandahar city and its suburbs on May 31 and June 1 respectively at Deh Khawaja and Chahar Soo, two army vehicles and a jeep were destroyed. In Chahar Soo the jeep of Director of the Afghan Intelligence Service came under attack and two officials were killed. In the operation in Deh Khawaja, Karmal soldiers managed to escape leaving behind damaged vehicles. In Baeti Mirza Khan a locality of Kandahar, the Mujahideen seized 6 barrels of ghee (edible oil) and a bundle of military uniforms.

Meanwhile, the Soviets have started operations in a number of areas of Helmand province over the past two weeks aided by fighter planes and gunship helicopters.

The Soviets have been air-dropping armoured vehicles and tanks.

The Mujahideen conducted a night raid on the Soviet camp in Nava Barakzar sub-division on May 24 in which they blew up three tanks along with the crew. They seized two Kalashnikovs, over 1000 rounds and 70 hand grenades. In Marjah area of the province, the Mujahideen are fighting against Soviets who are using artillery as well.

In an encounter taking place on May 25, the Soviet casualties were five while one Mujahid was martyred.--APA/AAP/AFP.

Dwindling of Karmal Troops

Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English 13 Jun 81 p 5

[Article by Prakash Chandra]

[Text] Diplomatic and press reports reaching New Delhi indicate that there's continuous heavy fighting in the cities of Kandahar and Herat. Another notable aspect is that the number of tribesmen joining the Afghan army is rapidly on the decline.

What is the future of Afghanistan under Soviet occupation?

Diplomatic observers, who are familiar with the scene, say that the Russians have shown no signs of withdrawing from that embattled country.

On the other hand, there have been unconfirmed reports that the Soviets have stepped up their military strength in Afghanistan. Various figures have been mentioned. But no diplomatic observer has been able to confirm with any degree of accuracy that 20,000 more troops have, in fact, been brought to Afghanistan.

But one of the notable aspects of the Afghan scene is that the number of tribesmen joining the Afghan army is rapidly on the decline.

According to one estimate, the number of Afghan troops has gone down from some 80,000 to 30,000. If these reports are to be believed, large-scale desertions have taken place from the Afghan army. These troops, mostly young people still in their 20s, are escaping into the mountains to join the rebels with their Russian-made equipment.

To prevent such occurrences on a wide scale, the Russians have reportedly employed some crack troops to shoot down the deserters. Usually, the Soviet troops have air cover with helicopters protecting their flanks.

Soviet Equipment

Yet, there are reports that the rebels using captured Russian equipment have been able to shoot down helicopters, even tanks and armoured vehicles.

The Indian consulate in Kandahar was reported to have been caught in a cross-fire between the rebels and the government troops. As a result, reports said that some of the diplomatic personnel had to be withdrawn from the consulate.

Some diplomatic sources in Delhi have been saying that the Afghan military units have been withdrawn from Kabul and rushed to Herat and Kandahar. The Russians have been compelled to beef up their own security. This points to suspicion that the Russians just do not trust the Afghans.

There is no doubt that the rebels are preparing to launch a major offensive in the areas adjoining the Pakistan-Afghan border and other provinces. Their only hope, ironically, is to secure more guns and ammunition from Afghan troops and even the Russians.

There are some reports indicating that the Russians themselves are willing to trade on the quiet small arms ammunition for foreign currency, liquor and foreign-made cigarettes. Such transactions have been going on on a fairly large scale in the interior of Afghanistan. And the Russian authorities appear to have shut their eyes to such deals.

Obviously, Moscow has neither the resources nor the political will to police all the points in Afghanistan and watch their own men.

The question diplomats based in Kabul are asking is whether the Russians will resort to chemical bombs on a bigger scale than before and how they would overcome the growing tribal resistance. For, it has been reported by Western correspondents who have visited rural areas that the morale of Afghan rebels is pretty high.

According to one journalist, the tribesmen are better trained, better armed than ever before. Their morale is high and they are prepared to fight until the Soviets leave their country.

Some diplomats tend to ridicule reports that there are 58 training camps on the Pakistan side of the Afghan border. According to one traveller who recently returned from Kabul, "You don't have to train these men, they are born with the gun. All they need is more discipline and better coordination."

The rebels are hungry for more arms, especially surface-to-air missiles which they can use against airborne Soviet troops. They also need more sophisticated guns and ammunitions.

But a great deal will depend on whether Pakistan can be used as a "conduit" for supplying arms to the rebels. The Pakistani generals insist that they do not want to be caught in the cross-fire between the Russians and the Afghan rebels. They do not want the Pakistan borders to be used as sanctuaries for the rebels and the supply of arms to them.

Shahi's Stand

However, Pakistan Foreign Minister Agha Shahi has said time and again in interviews with Western correspondents that his country is not interested in getting involved in any conflict with the Russian troops on the border and they do not want any international incident.

At the same time, it is implicit from what Mr. Shahi has said that Pakistan feels vulnerable against a possible Soviet threat. And this, they say, is the reason why they are seeking massive aid from Washington without enlarging the scope of their security treaty with the USA.

India's perception of threat from Pakistan, according to some observers, is directly linked with the continued clashes between the Afghan rebels and the Soviet troops. That threat will continue to haunt New Delhi unless the Soviets are able to raise a government in Kabul which will be nationally acceptable to all sections of the Afghan society.

And this seems to be an impossible task.

Senior Asian diplomats in New Delhi point out that the non-aligned initiative to end the deadlock in Afghanistan has not been very successful. For, Pakistan has not been willing to hold talks with the Afghan regime of Babrak Karmal.

In fact, indications are that the situation will remain as tense as before. And no political settlement is in sight which may be acceptable to both Moscow and Islamabad.

Observers conclude that the current impasse in Afghanistan continues to pose a security threat to India. Whatever the Russians might say, New Delhi will not be comforted by friendly noises from Moscow.

This has led to a sharp division between the opposition and the ruling Congress Party (I) headed by Mrs. Gandhi on the crucial question of Indo-Soviet relations.-- The Muslim-Depthnews Service.

Fresh Attacks on Kabul Forces

Karachi MORNING NEWS in English 14 Jun 81 p 8

[Text] London, June 13--Fresh attacks on Soviet and Karmal forces are being launched in the Afghan capital, reports received in Peshawar said.

According to the information, a frenzied mob in a suburban locality of Kabul 'Murad Baig' put on fire one dozen vehicles of Karmal soldiers, who were engaged in searching the Mujahideen and their refugees. The vehicles were stationed on the road when burnt.

After a little while, a Soviet force with two tanks and 6 armoured vehicles reached the spot. The masses confronted it with the help of Mujahideen. They killed 8 Soviets including an officer. One tank and 2 armoured vehicles were damaged.

Harkat-i-Inqilab-i-Islami sources reported that the Mujahideen were returning after a successful operation when a supervisor of Public Works Department joined them. He told them that Soviets put the Afghan labourers on work quite mercilessly on humiliating wages. The supervisor said his conscience was dissatisfied over the situation.

A report received from Paktia province said that the Mujahideen equipped with rocket launchers made an attack on an army convoy on May 30. The convoy was moving from the provincial headquarter Gardez to the cantonment of Khost. A tank and an army vehicle were destroyed. Four Kalashinkovs and a mine detector were seized by Mujahideen. The number of killed and wounded could not be confirmed as the convoy had taken them away. The attack was made near a place Shimmel.

On May 27, the Mujahideen attacked a Soviet force on patrol killing five of them in Mandah, a nearby locality of Urgeon cantonment of Paktika province. The killed included two officers. The Mujahideen seized a Kalashinkov and a telescope.--AAP

Defection of Karmel Officers

Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English 14 Jun 81 p 8

[Text] Peshawar, June 13--As many as 22 military officers along with a number of soldiers of Karmel forces defected their military units stationed in the village of Barkandi of Dara-e-Paige, in Kunar province and joined the Mujahideen last week.

A Jamiat-e-Islami Afghanistan source report from the battle front said that when the government sources knew about the rebellion they at once reacted and reinforced some fresh military troops there by means of helicopters.

Meanwhile, another unit was also sent from the Central High Command to the scene. The Mujahideen resisted very bravely and forced the government troops to retreat.

In the course of this encounter another group of a large number of Afghan troops decided to join the Mujahideen. The report says the Russian troops began firing on the defecting troops in a brutal manner which took lives of almost all of them, which were estimated at about 300 men, while only 20 of them could make good their escape and reached the Mujahideen positions.

In this fierce fighting eight Mujahideen laid down their lives and many of them received wounds.

Another report from the said province reveal that the Mujahideen killed the sub-Governor of Dara-e-Paige along with his companion namely Saeda Jan during the course of last week.

It further indicates a few other 'Parchami' leaders and workers have also been killed in Kenian city and Chamari and Alarzi villages during the past three weeks.

The report added: The Mujahideen belonging to Jamiat-e-Islami destroyed five Russian tanks and a military truck in this area in different combats, killing all the men on board.

Another report from Faryab province discloses that fierce fighting has taken place between Mujahideen and the Russians and Karmel-troops in the city of Darzab, a subsidy of Faryab province, two weeks back.

The Mujahideen reportedly killed four Communists and captured another two alive in Cheghchi and set on fire a military jeep.

In the encounter freedom-fighters captured two Russian jeeps, one armoured car, four rifles, five guns, two light machine guns and about 12,000 bullets.--PPI

CSO: 4600/36

AFGHANISTAN

HOSTILE ACTIONS PLAGUE KARMAL'S FORCES

Bus Hijack

Lahore THE PAKISTAN TIMES in English 12 Jun 81 p 14

[Text] New Delhi, June 11: Afghan guerillas hijacked a bus carrying Soviet and Afghan women tourists near Karizmir, about 20 kms north of the Afghan capital, last week, diplomatic sources said here yesterday.

The bus was found abandoned the next day with dead bodies of four passengers, three Afghan and one Soviet, the informants here said.

There was no trace of other passengers.--AFP

Mob Attacks

Peshawar KHYBER MAIL in English 14 Jun 81 p 4

[Text] London, June 13: Fresh attacks on Soviet and Karmal forces are being launched in the Afghan capital, reports received in Peshawar said.

According to the information a frenzied mob in a suburban locality of Kabul, 'Murad Baig,' put on fire one dozen vehicles of Karmal soldiers who were engaged in searching the Mujahideen and their refugees. The vehicles were stationed on the road when burnt.

After a little while, a Soviet force with two tanks and 6 armoured vehicles reached the spot. The masses confronted it with the help Mujahideen. They killed 8 Soviets including an officer. One tank and 2 armoured vehicles were damaged.

Harkat-i-Inqilab-i-Islami sources reported that the Mujahideen were returning after a successful operation when a supervisor of Public Works Department joined them. He told them that the Soviets put the Afghan Labourers on work quite mercilessly on humiliating wages. The supervisor said he was dissatisfied over the situation.--AAP.

Troop Ambushes

Lahore THE PAKISTAN TIMES in English 15 Jun 81 p 10

[Text] NEW DELHI, June 14: Anti-Government elements observing the first anniversary of the execution of a popular guerilla leader recently conducted several successful ambushes in Afghanistan, killing nearly 200 Soviet and Afghan troops, an APA report from Kabul said on Saturday.

Abdul Majid Kalakani, executed in June 1980, was one of the most effective leaders of the Afghan insurrection, responsible for organising attacks, ambushes and detections from Government forces.

The members of Kalakani (Organisation for Winning Freedom for Afghanistan) ambushed eight military posts in Parwan Province in a series of daring raids last Wednesday, killing over 100 Government soldiers and ruling Marxist party Militiamen, said a reliable Afghan source.

Heavy fighting was reported raging in at least two places in Panjsher Valley in Parwan between "guerillas and Soviet and Afghan Government troops. The source identified the places as Kalakan, which was Kalakani's power base, and Saraye Khawaja.

Afghan guerillas hiding in the remains of a mosque bombed earlier by the Soviets in Saraye Khawaja destroyed with rockets a Soviet convoy of four armoured personnel carriers, two tanks and 12 trucks last Sunday, the report said.

Kalakani a household name in Afghanistan, was a theology student who killed his college principal in 1957 and lived underground as an Afghan "Robin Hood" plun-

dering the rich to help the poor until his arrest during anti-Soviet riots in February 1980 in Kabul.

Afghan guerillas last Wednesday fired some rockets at the Bagramshir base, north of Kabul in Parwan Province hitting some oil storage tanks, the Kabul source reported. He gave no other details.

The same day, guerillas waylaid two Government buses carrying Afghan civil officials on the main highway from Charikar, Parwan's capital, to Kabul, the report said. It added that the buses were set on fire and several passengers captured.

In the Afghan capital guerilla bands stormed into the homes of members of the ruling party's rival 'Parcham' (banner) and 'Khalq' (masses) factions in the past week, assassinating about 30 activists the same source said.

Meanwhile heavy Soviet casualties were reported in fierce fighting near Sange Newshta in Logar Province, south of Kabul and at two places in neighbouring Warzak Province the report said. Many Afghan guerillas and civilians were killed in bombings by Soviet helicopter gunships, it added.

Babrak Karmal recently conducted visits to Afghanistan's four important cantonments to pacify unrest among the officers with an initiative to save the army institution from total disintegration.

The cantonments visited by Karmal are Jalalabad, Ghazni, Pul-i-Khumri in Baghlan Province and Charikar in Parwan Province.

According to authoritative sources of Agency Afghan Press Peshawar Office, Karmal conveyed to the officers during his addresses that the Soviets had been called by Tarakki and Hafizullah Amin. His administration had only fol-

lowed their precedent to repeat the offer.

The visit to the cantonments has followed the Karmal's secret tour to the Soviet Union before the reshuffle in the Cabinet.

Massive Desertions

Karachi BUSINESS RECORDER in English 20 Jun 81 p 3

[Text] New Delhi, June 19: The pro-Moscow regime of Babrak Karmal has launched a new conscription drive to replenish the ranks of its desertion plagued armed forces following increased resistance by guerrillas, a Kabul report said on Monday.

An estimated 10,000 Kabul high school students in the final year have been directed to enroll for compulsory military service, the source said.

All those who enroll will be eligible for graduation certificates without taking examinations, he added.

The source who has been accurate in the past, said a steady series of desertions and civil war casualties have reduced the strength of the Afghan army to 25,000 from 90,000 at the time for the December, 1979 Soviet military intervention. This forced the regime recently to lower the minimum draft age from 22 to 19, the source reported.

But boys as young as 15 were being forcibly taken to military induction camps by search parties making nightly sweeps of Kabul residential neighbourhoods, the sources said, adding that a large number of young men have fled to escape the draft.

Authorities in Kabul have also increased the term of service of all categories of soldiers by one year, the report said.

Talks or ...

Washington: ABC TV network said here last night, the Soviets will have either "to negotiate their way out of Afghanistan" or to increase immeasurably their forces there.

This summation concluded a special report on Afghanistan presented by Bureau chief Carl Bernstein who hit the limelight with his investigative reporting of the water-gate scandal as a 'WASHINGTON POST' reporter.

The TV network based its summation on reports of increasingly better organised resistance by increasingly better equipped guerrilla fighters.

It said, while it is true that hundreds of thousands of Afghans have been killed or wounded and over two million have taken refuge in Pakistan (making the largest refugee population in the world today the fact remains that the Soviets have got bogged down in Afghanistan, they have suffered some 6,000 casualties, and despite the heavy price, they have failed to establish any control over the country. In fact they have lost control even over the main roads of the mountainous state.

Carl Bernstein claimed that the rebels were employing increasingly more sophisticated arms including anti-air missiles that had enabled them to shoot down as many as 60 helicopters, the most deadly of the Soviet weapons.

New Delhi: A former editor of a government-owned newspaper was stabbed and seriously injured in the Afghan capital last week, reporters reaching here today from Kabul said.

Muhammed Wali Zalmi, was stabbed near his house in the Karte-e-Parwan area of the city on June 8, the report received by Afghan dissident sources said.

Zalmi who belongs to the Khalq faction of the ruling Peoples Democratic Party of Afghan (PDP) which is opposed to the dominant Parcham faction also served as the press attache in the United States during Hafizullah Amin's regime. He was called back soon after Babrak Karmal came to power in December 1979. Zalmi's condition is stated to be serious.--APA/AFP/PPI.

Amnesty Offer

Karachi BUSINESS RECORDER in English 21 Jun 81 p 8

[Text] NEW DELHI, June 20 The Soviet-installed regime in Afghanistan on Friday announced an amnesty to Muslim 'rebels' who surrender and to defectors from its dwindling military forces.

The announcement was contained in a decree issued by the government after a joint meeting of the ruling Marxist party and the presidium of the revolutionary council, chaired by President Babrak Karmal, and broadcast by the official Kabul radio.

'Those who voluntarily lay down their arms and deliver them to the government authorities are pardoned', said the decree, the text of which was broadcast by the radio, monitored in India.

The announcement followed admission by Kabul of continuing strikes by guerrilla bands and separate, independent reports of a spectacular June 9 rebel raid on the Bagram airbase near the Afghan capital.

'Those soldiers and personnel of the armed forces who have joined the counter revolutionaries and want to return will be pardoned', the resolution continued.

The decree also promised clemency for Afghans who have fled the rugged, central Asian nation but want to return: 'They will also be given the chance to resume their honourable life and profession under secure and peaceful conditions'.

It said that the Karmal Government was 'duty bound' to provide necessary facilities to those wanted to surrender and return. The amnesty offer did not elaborate on the sort of facilities that would be made available.--APA.

CSO: 4600/38

IRAN

MO'INFAR'S STRONG DEFENSE FOR BANI-SADR AT MAJLES

Tehran ETTELA'AT in Persian 22 Jun 81 pp 3, 14

[Text] On 20 and 21 Jun, discussions opposing and supporting the proposal declaring the political incompetency of the president continued. On the first day of this discussion, 'Ali Akbar Mo'infar spoke as the first opponent. Following is the speech of Engineer Mo'infar.

Speaking in opposition of the proposal to declare the president incompetent--in an atmosphere of excitement, before hearing the opposing and supporting views, before hearing the defense of the president, and when, before taking the final vote, the decisions have already been made--seems ineffective and useless, especially when the heat of emotions of those surrounding the Majles building and some of the streets, and who interpret the smallest opposing voice as opposition to Islam and the Islamic revolution, is so intense that the situation is potentially quite dangerous for the speaker.

There are those who are wrongly prepared to inflict any insult or harm on the speaker, and even to spill his blood, under the supposition that opposition to the proposal to dismiss the president is opposition to the revolution and the imam. In such an atmosphere, perhaps keeping silent, being an observer and not expressing opinions against the decisive resolution already taken would be wiser and more logical.

Or, one may consider casting an opposing vote and wholeheartedly facing the dangers as the only thing a representative of the Majles could do under present circumstances. Some friends believe that under such circumstances, basically, one should not even be present in the Majles to add spice to the hot "soup" being prepared by one's presence and one's likely participation in the discussion. Especially since the lives of the opponents, particularly those who are close friends of the president, would be in danger if they were to enter the Majles. Therefore, I believe that today one of the most sensitive pages in the history of Iran and Islam is being turned and that our new-found Islamic Republic is confronted with a great test.

Under such circumstances, guided by my commitment to the Islamic Republic and the revolution, I cannot remain silent, hold my tongue. Hence, in the brief opportunity given me to speak, I will say what I find to be in the best interest.

And I will leave it to God, since He bears witness that I have always tried to think and act independently; I am not dependent on any particular person or political group. What I have to say is not in defense of the person of Mr Bani-Sadr, the president, but is due to my anxiety for the future of the Islamic Republic and for the welfare of the nation, and especially to please God.

In the present situation, I do not think it right to speak of the differences in viewpoints which have existed from the beginning between Mr Bani-Sadr and myself or to speak of certain criticisms I have had of him in some instances, lest it be interpreted as exoneration of him, although I do respect him a great deal. If the views that the opponents of Mr Bani-Sadr express against him and the objections to and criticisms of him are exclusively what has already been said and written, which we all know about, I do not by any means find these objections and reasons proof of his political incompetence. In fact, in many instances they prove his commitment, duteousness, and political competence.

The proposal offered to the Majles as a declaration of the president's political incompetence can be criticised and analyzed from several standpoints. First, this issue has been raised at a time when not more than 10 days have passed since Mr Bani-Sadr was dismissed from a position which the imam had conferred on him in accordance with Principle 110 of the Constitution, the commander-in-chief of the armed forces.

The advantage that the opponents of Mr Bani-Sadr have taken of this dismissal has created a violent atmosphere against him. In such an atmosphere, he would have no chance to speak.

The position of commander-in-chief of the armed forces is independent of the presidency. According to the Constitution, it is among the duties and authority of the leadership. Any time the leader wishes, he can confer this position on someone and whenever he finds it appropriate, he can relieve him of the position.

Offering the proposal of the president's political incompetence to the Majles at this time serves to mix the two positions of the presidency and the imam's representative as commander-in-chief of the armed forces. In fact, the opponents of Mr Bani-Sadr who have from the beginning tried to oust him are taking maximum advantage of the particular atmosphere they have created after his dismissal as the commander-in-chief of the armed forces in order to oust him as president. If the imam finds it necessary at a particular time to

take over the command personally and without an intermediary, in accordance with the responsibility conferred on him by Principle 110 of the Constitution, first of all, this is not proof of the political incompetence and lack of ability of the person who has held this position as his representative; he has only found it appropriate. And secondly, supposing that this dismissal did mean that Mr Bani-Sadr was incompetent as the commander-in-chief of the armed forces, this supposed incompetence as commander-in-chief of the armed forces would not prove his political incompetence as president.

In addition, this issue is raised in the Majles at a time when Mr Bani-Sadr is the target of the most violent accusations from all sides that he, as president, has violated the laws, and he can by no means or power defend himself.

Any impartial observer knows that in such an atmosphere he would not be able to be present to defend himself against the accusations in person in the Majles. If the issue of the president's political incompetence is to be raised in the Majles, it should take place in a calm and open atmosphere devoid of any kind of excitement or pressure and free of any sort of fear or threats, in order for the supporters and opponents to be able to freely express their views, and for the president to have the chance to respond to everything he has been accused of.

But now, the vote of the Majles regarding the incompetency of Mr Bani-Sadr is taking place under such circumstances that the remaining press, the whole mass media, street gatherings, and the sermons of the Friday prayers are all focused against him.

And two newspapers which were not dependent on the ruling group have been illegally banned. If anyone would have the courage to mention the name of Mr Bani-Sadr or defend him any way in the street gatherings and around the Majles, he would be punished most violently. Is raising such an issue proper in such an atmosphere, at the beginning of the Islamic Republic? In my opinion, under the present circumstances, raising the issue of the president's political incompetence while he is practically living in confinement, his office has been attacked, his friends have been jailed and he has no means to defend himself, is not worthy of the Islamic Republic.

Another point is the way this issue is dealt with. We have mixed up the issue of the president's political incompetence with the issue of the extreme enmity toward Mr Bani-Sadr; not only have we already started to shout "death to Bani-Sadr" in the congregations of Friday prayers and around the Majles, but we have even attacked and insulted in the open session of the Majles the person who is, legally at any rate, presently the president and who will remain the president even after the vote of political incompetence by the Majles

unless the leader dismisses him in accordance with Paragraph 5 of Principle 110 of the Constitution.

This person is insulted and abused in the open session of the Majles and shouts of "death to Bani-Sadr" are heard during the official session. Is this the way to behave in accordance with the Constitution? In such an atmosphere, is it possible for all the representatives to exercise their free will in making the right decision, to vote free of the influence of any personal likes or dislikes or threats? It is interesting that the slogans are followed up by new ones. In a gathering on the occasion of the birthday of his holiness, the 12th Imam, the slogan shouted was "Bani-Sadr must be executed 100 percent by the Hezbollah"; and in front of the Majles, they shouted "Bani-Sadr anti-azla'" [as published]. Unfortunately, these slogans are broadcast by the Voice and Picture of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Thus, the verdict of the execution of a person has already been issued and the executioners, who introduce themselves as the Hezbollah, have also been pre-appointed. Now everybody awaits the vote of the Majles finding him politically incompetent. Honorable representatives, you yourselves have witnessed during the past few days the gathering of a large number of people in front of the Majles and their shouts of "death to Bani-Sadr." Is this the logical procedure which the Republic must employ in the future to dismiss its presidents and national authorities? It is interesting to note that in a speech the prime minister of the country thanks a group called the Hezbollah who have appeared on the scene. It becomes obvious that in the future what would rule the country is not law, but whoever could mobilize the largest number of the Hezbollah. Honorable representatives, it is in such an atmosphere that such an important issue has been raised. Is the way this great issue has been dealt with and is judgment under such conditions just and logical? But, in regards to the main issue, which is the proposal for political incompetency: When we carefully study the speeches, writings, and reasons of Mr Bani-Sadr's opponents, whether correct or incorrect, we see that they make certain statements concerning Mr Bani-Sadr's violation of the Constitution or they accuse him of offenses which must be determined by the judicial branch and not the legislative branch; and, furthermore, these issues have no relation to the political competency or incompetency of the president. By interfering in these issues concerning the actions and behavior of Mr Bani-Sadr in order to determine whether or not they are contrary to the Constitution, are we, as Parliamentarians, to pass judgment? Is this not interfering with the judicial branch? And is it not contrary to Principle 57 of the Constitution, which safeguards the independence of each branch? The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran has conferred the authority to dismiss the president on the leader through two channels--one through the State Supreme Court for his violations of the law, and another through the vote of the Majles concerning his political incompetence. If the Majles could determine the president's violation of his legal obligations

and would propose his dismissal, there would be no need for the Constitution to anticipate the verdict of the Supreme Court and the trial of the president. Therefore, the violation of legal obligations cannot be regarded as proof of the president's political incompetence and the Majles cannot issue a vote of political incompetence based on the violations of the president. It is the State Supreme Court that can issue such a decree. In order to investigate the incompetence of the president, first we must see what the duties of the president are and what weakness he has shown in carrying out his duties. Principle 113 of the Constitution recognizes the president as responsible for the implementation of the Constitution, regulating the relationship between the three branches, heading the executive branch, and as the highest official of the country after the leadership. Hence, if he has deviated in implementing the Constitution in the country, or if an action has taken place contrary to the Constitution and the president has failed to point out and follow up the matter, he must be considered incompetent. All of the honorable representatives bear witness that Mr Bani-Sadr has openly and insistently declared in every instance actions that he found contrary to the Constitution. And furthermore, not only has he not failed to carry out his duties, but his insistence has been the cause of the enmity towards him of those who have stepped outside the Constitution. Examples of these objections which the president has rightfully declared are those he made to the Supreme Judicial Council concerning the actions of that Council which were contrary to the Constitution. Had he been negligent in his duties and incompetent, he would not have been familiar with these issues. Mr Bani-Sadr, who according to Principle 134 is responsible for the relations between the three branches, rightly objected to the interference of the judicial branch with the legislative branch. Of course, a group of the representatives of the Majles, too, objected in due time and certain questions were asked; but, unfortunately, the judicial branch did not take any steps in this regard. They did not even respond to the responsible questions of the representatives of the Majles, although according to the Constitution, they were bound to do so. These include the interference of the prosecutor of the State Supreme Court in the appointment of the supervisor of the Voice and Picture of the Islamic Republic, the issuance of instructions by the Supreme Judicial Council for determining the punishment for the offenses of the counterrevolutionaries--which should have been ratified by the Majles, but the Supreme Judicial Council completely disregarded the Majles and did not even consult with a few representatives of the Majles on part of the punishment law. In my opinion, if Mr Bani-Sadr had remained silent in the face of these open transgressions of the judicial branch on the legislative branch, he would have shown his incompetence, not because he has raised objections. The president objected in time to the agreement between Iran and the United States, which was a clear violation of Principles 50, 53, 75, and 125 of the Constitution. If he had done otherwise, then we should have doubted his competence. We should not find him irresponsible and guilty and

incompetent for having carried out his legal duty. But in regards to the head of the executive branch, you have witnessed how, contrary to Principle 124 of the Constitution, the prime ministry of Mr Mohammad 'Ali Baza'i was forced upon the president although according to the Constitution the prime minister should be acceptable to the president. Has he not said many times that he finds Mr Baza'i unable to manage the affairs of the country? And was it not the Majles that forced the prime minister on him? It might be asked why Mr Bani-Sadr gave in; he should have presented the person he wanted as prime minister. And if that person was not confirmed, he should have presented someone else, I agree. But if the legislative branch had not forced its way and the Majles only played a role in accepting or rejecting the person or persons presented by the president, then this problem would not have occurred. Then, if the president was not able to present as the prime minister a competent person who would have the approval of the Majles in a reasonable period of time, he could have been considered politically incompetent. But, when the legislative branch has overstepped the bounds decided for it by the Constitution, can it qualify the president politically incompetent based on a weakness which is the result of what was forced on him by the legislative branch? In the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Constitution had anticipated the possibility of differences of opinion between the president and the representatives of the Majles, who are directly elected by the people. But were the Constitution carried out to the letter, the possibility of differences of opinion between the president, that is, the executive branch, and the prime minister, who also belongs to the executive branch, would have been unlikely. Hence, the main reason behind these problems is that the Constitution was not followed. And if the president is at fault for having yielded to the Majles, the Majles shares greatly in this fault, which it itself had imposed. We said that the president's political incompetence means that he has failed and been incapable in carrying out his duties. Principle 122 of the Constitution clearly states that the president is responsible to the people within the limit of his authority and duties and this responsibility is determined by law. Hence, first, what authority and duties are determined for the president except those that the Constitution clearly states? And what law has passed through the Majles which determines the manner in which to investigate the violations? A person was chosen by the nation as the president and from the first day the elements of the ruling power have blocked his carrying out his duties, hoping for his downfall. And now are we saying that he does not possess the necessary political competence? Is this right? On the one hand, we consider him the scarecrow in the field who should not interfere in any business, and on the other, we say that he is unable to manage the country. Are these not double standards?

Honorable representatives, you must note that we are not in a position to have the right to change the president who merely does not

conform to our beliefs and wishes. The Constitution has not given us this prerogative.

Presidential elections are not a two stage process necessitating the ratification of the Majles--meaning that the people vote and then the Majles vetoes their vote. The right given to the Majles by the Constitution is only to determine if the president is politically incompetent. This does not mean that the Majles can, under this pretext, dismiss a president who merely does not conform to its wishes. The proponents of the proposal which has been offered to the Majles hope to take advantage of the phrase "political incompetence" in order to oust a president who, in his opponents' view, will not compromise. Nowhere in the Constitution is such an action permitted. And it does not give the Majles the permission to demand his dismissal just because the Majles has not agreed with the president or did not agree with him.

Therefore, I believe the action we are taking now to dismiss a president with whom we do not agree under the pretext of his political incompetence is contrary to the Constitution. And if our reasons consist of his supposed violations of the Constitution, it is not within our authority to investigate such; the necessary injunction should be issued by the Justice Department. Honorable representatives, all this aside, whether you vote in favor of the president's political incompetence or remember that according to the Constitution, and given the existing evidence, you do not have the grounds to do so, I believe that Mr Bani-Sadr, given the situation which has been created, cannot continue as president. But why should this affair go through an unjust process? And why should we leave behind such a memory of the first presidential term. What is on my mind is not whether or not Mr Bani-Sadr should keep the position of president. Special attention and motives have caused this inappropriate situation in the country and those elements who are trying for absolute control of the country will not stop at anything to take over everything. With the dismissal of Mr Bani-Sadr, according to the Constitution, a Council of the Republic, made up of the prime minister, the speaker of the Majles, and the head of the State Supreme Court will be formed. Although presidential elections are supposed to take place within 50 days, given the existence of the war and other difficulties, it seems unlikely that this will be acted upon. Therefore, all power will, for all practical purposes, be concentrated in a special formula. And with what we know about this group--they consider anyone who does not support them as their opponents and thereby reject him--it will not be long before a terrible dictatorship will be imposed on the country.

Honorable representatives of the Islamic Consultative Assembly, the wish and the desire of each one of us is for an Islamic government and the implementation of Islamic equity, especially the complete implementation of Islamic laws in our own society in such a way that

we can show to a world thirsting for justice a model and an example. But with the way we are going, all power will be transferred to one particular group and the elimination of all the freedoms that Islam has bestowed to mankind will follow. Unfortunately, every wrong action is done under the name of Islam and the Islamic Republic. And this will misrepresent our dear Islam and will cause future generations of the world to misunderstand Islamic government. If no resistance is put up against this one party system today, we must expect a horrible dictatorship, on the order of dictatorships in communist countries, only with an Islamic coloring, which will be much harder to be freed of than the regime of monarchy.

Oh, imam of the people, and representatives of the people, I have said what I think is advisable. We come from God and unto Him do we return.

9593

CSO: 4640/23

IRAN

CABINET OFFICIAL ANALYZES THIS YEAR'S BUDGET

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 27 May 81 p 11

[Commentary by Dr Mohammad Taqi Banki, Secretary of the Budget Committee: "An Analysis of the National Budget of 1360 (1981-82)"]

[Text] Third, a detailed report must be given to the prime minister after one month.

Fourth, the conditions of the country and the war in various areas require us to find it unnecessary to always follow the laws that have not as yet been ratified by the Islamic Consultative Assembly [as published] and whenever the interests of the nation are at issue, the executive organizations have permission to make expenditures, although a detailed report must be given to the representatives of the people. The proposal of the amendment is such that the government does not oppose the documentation and regulation of financial affairs. Certainly, the government believes that extreme care must be taken in spending money from the treasury. Hence, it has no fear of presenting a report explaining the expenditures for the representatives of the Parliament, since it wants the job to be done. It is requested of the representatives that they pay attention to this important point. The representatives of distant cities know very well how favorable conditions and exceptional resources for the implementation of improvement projects have been lost because of adherence to these laws and as a result the projects were not carried out. Basically, the goal of the government is not to escape giving reports; the concern of the government is to provide the conditions for more services. I request of the honorable representatives that they deal with the issue carefully and not forget the conditions and urgent needs of their constituents and the necessity of speed in improving their conditions when the time comes for deciding about this amendment.

The government has asked in this bill permission to spend 20 percent of the improvement expenditure disregarding the regulations of the General Accounting Law, based on the experiences of the past 2 years. The government believes that the emergency projects which did not

adhere to this law have been carried out much faster. The president believes wisely that this law has caused disorder and he has said, "I think two years of experience after the revolution is enough to prove the correctness of this statement to everybody."

For the information of the representatives and readers, I will mention a few examples of the bills that have been ratified by the Revolutionary Council in the past two years allowing some of the projects to be carried out without adhering to the General Accounting Law, and I hope that the Assembly, before the ratification or rejection of the above amendment, will study the results of these projects in order to make a more informed decision.

A. The amendment to the bill establishing the office of the president of the Islamic Republic. It is stated in this bill:

"The afore-mentioned project should be carried out with a budget of 160 million rials, disregarding the regulations and legal procedures of the General Accounting Law and Planning and Budget, the criteria of the charter of governmental trade, and the Amendment to Article 85 of the National Budget Law of 1356 [1977-78], in any manner which is found appropriate."

As you see, not only the General Accounting Law but also the Planning and Budget Law has been disregarded because the implementation of the project has been deemed important and necessary for the country. The new-found republic must have an office deserving of the activities of the president in order that affairs be better handled.

Now, consider that in many instances the failure of small projects, such as providing water for a small town, could be a propaganda tool for opponents and could endanger the national security. This amendment anticipates the prevention of such incidents.

(Now, does the president still think that the disregard for the Accounting Law to build the presidential office is because of financial difficulties or in order to speed up an important and necessary issue?)

The bill, ratified on 17 Ordibehesht 59 [7 May 80], concerning the Budget to phase out the 10-rial notes of the previous regime and help prevent their illegal entry.

According to this bill, the amount of 350 million rials (35 million toman) is to be put at the disposal of the Central Bank for collecting the notes. The Central Bank is to spend the money without following financial and bureaucratic regulations and is to report its expenses to the first General Assembly of the Central Bank that year.

As you can see, collection of the notes, which were part of the inheritance of the tyrant, was necessary and they had to be eliminated quickly. But the Revolutionary Council had omitted this single article--to create confusion or because they felt sorry for the country and the people?

C. The bill, ratified on 25 Tir 59 [16 Jul 80], to provide funds for aid to inventors, discoverers, and creative individuals.

According to this bill, the amount of 2 billion rials was to be given to the Ministry of Industries and Mines to aid inventors, etc. The use of this fund is excepted from the General Accounting Law and other general governmental regulations.

D. The bill concerning the allotment of 100 million rials for housing and employment for the refugees from Kurdistan, as determined by the president and ratified on 25 Tir 59 [16 Jul 80], which has, of course, due to the necessity of the plan, been exempted from the General Accounting Law.

These are only a few examples. There have been many bills written and ratified during the past two years which have exempted from the General Accounting Law expenditures of funds. Of course, the intention of the authorities in writing and ratifying the above bills is nothing more than to speed up the affairs and improve the conditions of the country.

Now, at this stage when the executive authorities are burdened by overpowering difficulties, objections to the issue of these exemptions which have truly been based on the necessities of time and place would make you suspect, even if only momentarily, that the real purpose is to bring down the government and prove that the "scientific predictions" were true. I take refuge unto God from the lethargy of wisdom and the ugliness of sin and in Him seek help.

In any case, in all scientific predictions, the preparations anticipate the results. Here, I must suggest to the representatives and those people who desire the fall of the government which has been scientifically predicted and are worried about its not happening at the end of the two months, that they try to prevent the ratification of the amendments the government has presented. Then, of course, the scientific predictions may come true.

4. Concerning Amendment 32 which states:

"The Organization of Planning and Budget is to be allowed to allocate according to need the share of each of the revolutionary institutions from the funds assigned in 53009 (the expenses of revolutionary institutions) of Part 4 of this law.

"The use of the above funds as well as the funds in 131600 (Bonyad-e Shahid) follow the charters which are to be approved by the Cabinet ministers.

"It has been argued that the Accounting Law should be implemented in the revolutionary institutions and secondly the use of the funds should be dependent on the charters approved by the Cabinet ministers and it has been a source of worry that this vast authority would be given to the government which will be able to decide what is to be subjected to the General Accounting Law without the knowledge of the representatives."

Mr Bani-Hadr's anxiety stems from lack of attention to the Articles of the General Accounting Law. As was said earlier, the use of some funds which can be apportioned disregarding the regulations of the General Accounting Law does not necessarily mean that it would be "hidden from the representatives." Since, according to Amendment 2, Article 88, quoted above, it must be reported to the Assembly, and the honorable representatives can be informed in detail of the way the funds are spent. If they find deviations, legal action can be taken. It has been stated that the serving government intends to serve and carry out the heavy responsibilities placed on its shoulders according to the law. The government has realized that because of the sensitive national conditions, the opportunities must not be lost and, therefore, the objective has been to speed up the affairs. But, on the other hand, the Assembly, too, must be in the current of affairs, and, of course, this amendment will cover both objectives.

4. Concerning Amendment 37 which states:

"The resolution of 21 Tir 59 [12 Jul 80] of the Revolutionary Council of the Islamic Republic of Iran allows to be put at the disposal of the Supervisory Council of the Organization for Scientific and Industrial Research of Iran from Fund 501002 (special expenditure of the executive organizations) of Part 4 of this law up to 800 million (800,000,000) rials to be used to assist creators, inventors, and researchers of scientific and industrial fields in accordance with the criteria approved by a committee made up of the ministers of Culture and Higher Education, Industries and Mines, the Organization for Planning and Budget, and one minister chosen by the prime minister."

The use of funds as stated in this amendment follows the charter of the Organization of Iranian Scientific and Industrial Research.

The objection has been raised as to why the funds for the above organization are not ratified by the Assembly from the beginning.

In this regard, the following points are of great importance.

A. This organization, as was pointed out above, was established on 21 Tir 59 [12 Jul 80] by a resolution of the Revolutionary Council (during the last days of the Council).

B. The brothers in the Cabinet believe that all the executive affairs of the country must be carried out under the supervision of the government and the government should have control over them in order to be able to carry out its duty through the coordination of all the organizations. There are certain views concerning this organization which will be stated if required by the proper authorities in due time.

C. A study of the charter of this organization shows that the charter does not have the necessary versatility, perhaps due to the haste in writing it and because of the urgency of time. In any case, I have enclosed the charter to reveal to the dear readers through their careful study of it the proof of what I have said earlier.

D. But why is it stated in the amendment that a committee made up of several ministers must approve the way the funds are used? When we look at Paragraph C, Article 2 of the charter, concerning the goals and duties of the organization, the answer to this question becomes quite obvious.

"C. Coordinating research establishments and cooperating with the industrial and economic centers of the country." You can see that the duty of this organization is to coordinate all research establishments. Think, for a moment, of the extent of the function of this organization. You can see, easily, that in order to create coordination between several organizations, you must have authority over all of them. Now, in practice, remember that each one of the ministries of Culture and Higher Education, Industries and Mines, Post, Telegraph, etc. have research organizations.

The rest concerning the budget will be published in future issues.

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SAUDI ARABIA

BRIEFS

SAUDI PIPELINE TO YANBU TO BEGIN OPERATION--Oil will begin flowing on July 1 through the 1,300-kilometre pipeline from Saudi Arabia's eastern oilfields to the Red Sea port of Yanbu, Abdul Hady Taher, Governor of the state-owned Petromin oil company announced last week. The 48-inch pipeline will have an annual throughput capacity of 92 million tons, with an eventual capacity of 117 million tons a year. [Text] [L. IS AN-NAHAR ARAB REPORT & MEMO in English 8 Jun 81 Vol 23 pp 8]

CSO: 4300/21

GOVERNMENT FACES PROBLEMS CONTROLLING PRICES, CURBING PROFITEERS

Damascus TISHIRIN in Arabic 22 May 81 p 3

/Article by Najl As'ad: "The Supply Surveillance Situation in Some of Our Governorates"/

/Text/ One of the most prominent issues concerning the citizen, one which takes a large amount of his time and attention, is the "food question." This question is related to supply surveillance, inasmuch as surveillance is an important means for preserving price stability and providing the consumer market with goods.

At a time when the food question takes priority among the concerns of the government sectors which are connected to this issue, the importance of supply surveillance stands out as an effective, serious participant in "braking" the growing crisis in this area and preserving price levels as stipulated by the competent bodies.

It is certain that supply surveillance is a strong, effective weapon in the hand of the masses in inhibiting monopolists and protecting the masses from exploitation.

It is our intent to give a broad review of the status of supply surveillance in the country through the achievements it has made last year before and /see/ whether surveillance has achieved the desired objective. It is necessary to pass the following figures in review. The number of supply arrests arranged by supply departments in the past year, 1980, in various governorates of the country against violators came to about 21,000 supported by the provisions of Law 123 for 1960 regarding supply and pricing affairs and Law 158 for 1960 regarding the repression of fraud. The arrests were broken down according to two types of violation: 13,885 were arrests of pricing violators and 6,973 were arrests of people who ventured to commit fraud and deception. Here it is our intent not to give these figures as news but rather to make a comparative analytical survey in order to deduce the real situation and circumstances of the arrest and the different conditions that exist, so that some light may be cast on this problem, while stressing that the activity of departments and the number of arrests organized are not radically proportionate to the problem.

The first thing we note is a severe drop in the rate of supply arrests recorded during the past year, 1980, from those in the preceding year. The number of arrests for both types in the year 1979 totalled 53,000, which is the highest rate for such arrests in the last decade.

We must in principle attribute this severe drop to the effect of Legislative Edict 2 for 1980. Does this, however, mean that the sellers have been inhibited by its effect or that the Supply Surveillance /Agency/ has reduced its campaigns?

The answer to this becomes clear only through daily concerns, by scrutinizing them from close at hand. Citizens are still complaining about sellers' pricing violations and concealment of goods, the fact that sellers commit themselves to the stipulated pricing then evade it by failing to have the goods sold conform to their actual characteristics, and other loopholes through which sellers can commit evasion at the expense of the consumers. These are continuous, surveillance cannot follow up on them with its ordinary resources, and citizens ultimately cannot waste their time in arguments and complaints when they buy numerous goods.

Let us go back again to the figures set down in Supply Surveillance ledgers in the governorates last year.

In the Governorate of Aleppo, 2,689 arrests were recorded, about the same number was recorded in the Governorate of Hama, and 1,602 were recorded in the Governorate of Dar'a, while only 1,235 arrests were recorded in the Governorate of Hamah.

These figures are not in keeping with the scope of consumption, measured by quality or quantity, in any governorate.

This severe discrepancy is greater than it seems in anti-fraud arrests. The number of arrests recorded in the Governorate of the City of Damascus came to 313, while in most other governorates of the country a figure greater than this was recorded for each governorate. Since it is well known to most consumers that fraudulent activities are generally concentrated in foodstuffs how can that be, since the city of Damascus has the lion's share of restaurants?

Applying these figures to the real state of consumer affairs does not give use a complete reflection of the real relationship between these figures and the state of affairs. From this data, it is necessary to record the following observations:

The high rate of supply violations and the low rates of violations of suppressions of fraud, especially in the main cities.

Whatever the type and punishment of the supply arrest might be, the problem is not being radically resolved, because the issue of pricing is not being presented in a well-studied, scientific fashion.

In spite of the concentration of supply arrests on such widely-consumed goods as vegetables, bread, meat and most foodstuffs, the rates of violations in these commodities are in practice rising greatly, and Supply Surveillance activity is confined to this area, while other seasonal commodities fail to receive attention in terms of supply and remain a field for consumer exploitation, like other service sector fields which do not receive attention from Surveillance.

The great proliferation of consumer goods keeps Surveillance from exercising total control over all commodities; for example, one grocery shop has 100 types of goods.

A great shortage in the number of supply overseers; for example the number of overseers in the city of Damascus does not exceed 30. One should bear in mind that sales outlets with permits are numbered in the tens of thousands, to say nothing of vendors without permits and people who are concentrated in areas where there are housing violations, who take pleasure in playing with the livelihood of citizens who have no way to get in touch with Surveillance.

The near absence of supply surveillance in the rural areas.

The low rate of surveillance over foodstuffs on the excuse that specifications for many types of food are not included in the ministry decree stipulating this and the fact that surveillance is confined to tabulating priority commodities.

In spite of these measures in the area of pricing arrests and the endeavor to eliminate the important loopholes in them, surveillance is still below the requisite standard. In spite of concern with the role and development of surveillance and stress on the fact that the level of supply surveillance is no less important than surveillance in other government agencies, Supply Surveillance's involvement remains restricted to arranging a certain overall number of arrests per year, and nothing more than that.

Why Pricing Violations?

A question which always comes up is why sellers commit pricing violations from one hour to the next. Does this mean that the seller is not realizing an acceptable profit margin? No one is persuaded by this, now that substantial competition has arisen among merchants and groceries.

The citizens' everyday foodstuffs, especially vegetables, are commodities where the base of violations is broad; vegetables are subject to the law of supply and demand and the agencies concerned have not yet managed to control this problem. A review of General Vegetable Company purchases from producers illustrates this problem: in 3 months, this company managed to attract only a small amount of the vegetables which were imported, and these imports continued to go directly to the sellers from the private sector, which naturally kept the prices of these goods high, since they were imported and were in the hands of the private sector at the same time. Thus this has truly become a luxury transaction, the public sector has lost control of what is considered to be one of the most important of commodities, and this has been left in the hand of the private sector. The General Vegetable and Fruit Company has not been able to assume the role assigned to it, the ordinary consumer remains at the mercy of the wholesale merchant and the retail vendor, and surveillance over these commodities has been feeble, all at the same time.

What is lacking in the supply situation and pricing affairs is a thorough study of the production of the commodities themselves; the failure of the rules followed in pricing in the past has been proved, and the costs of the local producer have not been taken into account. This has prompted peasants to abandon vegetable farming, the country has become a vegetable importer during many months of the year, and the prices of vegetables, and profits on them at the same time, have multiplied. However, the improvement in these prices has most recently enticed farmers to grow vegetables; the sources concerned point out that the country has not imported potatoes this year, now that local output has managed to cover the local market along with a reasonable profit margin for the local producer.

A great deal has been stated on the situation in Supply, but, by /viewing/ its accomplishments and comparing the arrests it has made with the actual state of affairs, it appears that Supply Surveillance is standing on the sidelines of the question of foodstuffs: in the first place, this issue exceeds the capacity of Surveillance and Surveillance has not yet reached the desired level and has continued to rely on personnel who are not specialized and lack training and commitment.

11887

CSO: 4304/18

PROBLEM OF DESERT ENCROACHMENT REVIEWED

Paris AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI In Arabic 25-31 May 81

/Article by 'Afif al-Razzaz: "Agriculture: The Desert Is Encroaching and Experts Meet To Stand up to It"/

/Text/ The regional meeting of agricultural resource management, protection and development experts was held in Damascus last week, and lasted 6 days. In the course of the meetings, those in attendance discussed the issue of the spread of desert in the region, that is, the transformation of farmland and pasturage into land which is not fit for agricultural use.

Supervising the meeting, through mutual cooperation and coordination, were the Ministry of Agriculture and Agrarian Reform in Syria, the Arab Center for Arid Region and Dry Land Studies, the Economic Commission for West Asia (ECWA) and the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO). These two latter organizations belong to the United Nations.

The Syrian minister of agriculture, Dr Hamid Musawkar, stated, in the inaugural speech he gave on behalf of Prime Minister Dr 'Abd-al-Ra'uf al-Kasim, that the problem of desert encroachment has recently begun to provoke anxiety in developing countries as a result of unintelligent use of natural resources and neglect in maintaining them and protecting them from deterioration.

The effect of this problem is negatively reflected on all production because the productive capabilities of most natural resources used in production are based on delicate material and organic balances whose secrets must be ascertained so that we can control them closely and dominate them.

Dr Musawkar called for a rapid evaluation process to be conducted on natural resources in the area in view of the damage which has occurred to them so far and the increasing pressures to which they have been exposed. He also stressed the need to put forth comprehensive integrated land use planning which will combine material and economic requirements with prevailing social and administrative structures.

Dr Muhammad Zakariya Isma'il, the deputy executive secretary of the Economic Commission of West Asia, which is the organization that summoned the meeting and provided the basic contributions for organizing it, pointed out that the meeting arose from a working plan to combat desert encroachment which the United Nations conference had approved and that it was partially carrying out the resolution of the Economic Commission of West Asia at its sixth session.

Maldistribution of Resources

In his statement, Dr Isma'il referred to the maldistribution of natural resources in the region and the grave damage which has resulted from that in the context of the environment and the living conditions of people inhabiting rural areas. He warned that the current wealth of the area (oil) was of a temporary nature and that it was fundamentally based on non-renewable resources, "which encourages us to exploit existing opportunities to increase the flow of our surplus revenues in order to manage and preserve our agricultural resources."

Dr Jum'ah 'Abd-al-Karim, director of lands in the Syrian Ministry of Agriculture, presented a comprehensive review of the problem of desert encroachment in Syria and the practical solutions which have been adopted to cope with it. These are to be considered a progressive step in this area in the regional context.

Dr 'Abd-al-Karim enumerated the factors behind desert encroachment in Syria, pointing out that the most important element is aridity, since 60 percent of Syrian land does not receive enough rain for the pursuit of economic farming. Among the other natural factors he mentioned were soil erosion, especially in the coastal areas, as a result of intense rainfall and land slippage, and the problem of annual inundation and flooding by water in some areas.

Most of the remaining factors of desert encroachment are the doing of man, such as early and excessive grazing, gathering of firewood, increased land salinity, abuse of forest areas, excessive use of groundwater, forest fires, abuse of the desert, and the decline in soil fertility as a result of the misapplication of the farming cycle.

Stopping the Spread of the Desert

Solutions to this problem are numerous and various. Some depend on agricultural enlightenment as regards damage by man to the land and others are technical. Among the latter are:

Solving the problem of aridity by establishing large dams such as the Euphrates Dam, which will water about 640,000 hectares of reclaimed farmland and smaller earth dams in flood areas and small rivers. Of these, 17 have been erected in Syria, storing about 188 million cubic meters of water and irrigating 9,000 hectares of farmland annually.

Numerous studies have been set forth to solve the problem of increasing farmland salinity and lessen its danger; in addition, irrigation and drainage activities have been organized in high-salinity wells.

A start has been made on the reclamation of mountain lands with steep slopes in order to eliminate dangers of soil erosion by establishing terraces and performing the requisite grading operations.

In order to stop the threat of desert encroachment, a green belt and green islands have been established. The belt, 22,000 hectares in area, 1,100 kilometers long and 20 kilometers wide, stretches from the Iraqi to the Jordanian border and limits the spread of wilderness and desert encroachment on built-up areas.

In the area of annual inundations and flooded lands, measures have been taken to reclaim this land and place it within agricultural use activities. The project to dry out the al-Chab marshes has been one of the biggest ones in Syria, as 45,000 hectares of marshland have been reclaimed and have become among the most fertile of areas.

The problem which remains unsolved is that of the misuse of groundwater. Dr 'Abd-al-Karim described that as serious and pointed out that decisive measures have not yet been taken with regard to it; although some items of legislation exist to regulate this and to prohibit the haphazard drilling of wells, farmers still indulge in excessive water use and there are no set rules on that.

This meeting to combat desert encroachment has undoubtedly been one of the most important Arab scientific conference organized lately, especially since it is related to a vital, urgent, basic problem, that of guaranteeing food for rapidly increasing numbers of inhabitants who have now started suffering from a tremendous deficit in foodstuffs which compels them to spend large amounts of money to import the food from abroad.

Numerous studies of great benefit have been provided in the field of fighting the spread of desert in the region and raising the level of agricultural output, and we will return to review these on future occasions.

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CSO: 4304/18

ZAYID'S PERFORMANCE, LEADERSHIP ANALYZED

London AL-MAJALLAH in Arabic 23 May 81 p 20

[Article by W.R.: "Zayid, Gulf Council Chairman, Is Cheerful, With Grip of Silk"]

[Text] Abu Dhabi--Exclusive Dispatch--If Shaykh Zayid ibn Sultan Al Nuhayyan, the UAE President, had the talent for writing he would have probably written a book on a new method of political thinking and system of government because whoever visits the Emirate of Abu Dhabi and observes the march of the seven emirates in the State of the United Arab Emirates becomes certain that were it not for Zayid, the reality would be different. If you blindfold a foreigner and put him aboard a plane that lands at Abu Dhabi airport and then remove his blindfold, he would tell you: "We are in a U.S. city in a hot climate," because all these trees and flowers that are planted on vast carpets of green grass, that engulf all of Abu Dhabi's roads and squares and that are extremely well kept would not have been had Zayid not loved planting.

One of the flaws of those who work with state leaders is their endeavor to please the leaders and to go to excesses in pleasing them. Perhaps this flaw has been Abu Dhabi's good fortune because agriculture has developed due to the interest of the head of state in it and civil engineering has expanded and specialized because the head of the state inquires about it constantly. Even this seven-emirate union came into existence a decade ago because Zayid insisted on its creation and because he has been serious in safeguarding it. Some pessimists go as far as fearing for the union after Zayid.

Every time the union is exposed to an upheaval of any sort, Zayid is the one who listens to advice and is the first to give it and the one who proceeds immediately to couple his advice with measures that pacify those among the other emirate rulers who are restless and who have their complaints. Zayid is one of the Gulf's most controversial personalities. He is even the Gulf's most mysterious personality, not because he is close-lipped and secretive, which he is not, but because he is open, exposed and simple. He strives hard to maintain his simplicity and he perhaps personifies more than others the concept of leadership among the Arabs: "Only he who eats what they eat, wears what they wear and lives their life can be a leader."

Zayid, as his compatriots call him even when they are debating with him, voicing their complaints or making their requests in his council, is in his early fifties.

He has a strong build and a long strong neck on which rest a lean face and two sharp and extremely alert eyes that have a penetrating look which, in the desert, is like an alternative to a person's identity cards. He wears a black beard and a mustache that covers his upper lip. When shaking hands, he extends a firm hand, the hand of a youth who shoveled sand and of a man who hunts and plants. He looks strong and graceful when he walks or moves.

From a young man unknown outside his emirate and one very much respected in it, Shaykh Zayid has become the center of news as the ruler of the sixth largest oil-producing country in the world.

Even during the silent struggle he had with Shaykh Shakhbut, his older brother and the ruler of the emirate before him, Shaykh Zayid was the good man who embodied, in the eyes of his tribe and of the Abu Dhabi people, enthusiasm versus Shakhbut who had ruled the emirate for 38 years without being able to understand the facts and requirements of the age. Shakhbut now lives honored, though in the shadows, in the city of al-'Ayn.

Despite his simplicity and his instinctive intelligence, Shaykh Zayid is still an idealistic thinker. He says for example: "Why can't we turn this place into a part of paradise?" He still thinks of paradise as he used to imagine it when he was a child in the desert, with date palms, pomegranate trees, and springs and rivers everywhere.

Shaykh Zayid manages his emirate and presides over the UAE with a grip of silk. He combines all the intelligence of a pearl merchant and all the tactical intelligence of a deer hunter and the hunter of bustards with falcons. His talent for creating harmony and reconciliation is unique. He has changed everything in Abu Dhabi but has not himself changed. He always asserts: "I do not want to change my personality by any conscientious effort." Perhaps the reason for this is his deep religious faith and the strength he derives from this faith in exercising his responsibilities. Because of his attachment to and fondness for agriculture and civil organization, he used to explain during the unity negotiations with the other six emirates the benefits of unity and the growth potentials which would come with this unity by describing the highways which would penetrate the desert to link the emirates instead of the sand trails. He promised the other emirates the beauty of driving cars on paved roads surrounded by green trees and beautiful scenery. He has actually achieved this. His council is comfortable, cheerful, and free of arrogance. He exercises his powers according to the tribe's interpretation of its interests.

Perhaps the secret behind the good performance of his duties is his constantly cheerful disposition. He does not get too serious and he breathes a breath of vitality and joy into every act and among all those around him. During the phases of fundamental change experienced by the area, whether the discovery of oil or the departure of Britain, the winds of distress and dejection at times engulfed those around him. But his cheerfulness and his idealism scattered the fears and the perils. His acquaintance with the outside world came late, considering that he made his first trip outside his country in 1953. When he saw what he saw in Europe, he returned more idealistic and with greater fondness for work and started

to talk about his wish "to create happiness for his people." As for his happiness, it lies in hunting bustards for long weeks either in his country or in Pakistan.

On 25 May 1981 when Shaykh Zayid will be heading the first session of the Higher Council of the Gulf Cooperation Council--this organization whose creation will be confirmed in this summit--he will remain in his own eyes and in the eyes of the heads of state who will discuss matters with him that desert youth who more than 2 decades ago watched Commandant Cousteau, the famous French oceanologist who is known to every television viewer in the world, dive under the Abu Dhabi waters with his "metal lung," meaning his oxygen tank, to give his final opinion on the presence of oil in the emirate. On that date, Zayid decided to himself that his emirate would never remain the same as it had been. As for Zayid himself, he will remain as he has been.

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